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Abstract
We study Pareto optimal policy reforms aimed at overhauling retirement nancing as
an integral part of the tax and transfer system. Our framework for policy analysis is a
heterogeneous-agent overlapping-generations model that performs well in matching the ag-
gregate and distributional features of the U.S. economy. We present a test of Pareto optimality
that identies the main source of ineciency in the status quo policies. Our test suggests that
lack of asset subsidies late in life is the main source of ineciency when annuity markets are
incomplete. We solve for Pareto optimal policy reforms and show that earnings tax reforms
cannot yield eciency gains. On the other hand, progressive asset subsidies provide a pow-
erful tool for Pareto optimal reforms. We implement our Pareto optimal policy reform in an
economy that features demographic change. The reform reduces the present discounted value
of net resources consumed by each generation by about 5 percent in the steady state. These
gains amount to a one-time lump-sum transfer to the initial generation equal to 9 percent of
the GDP.
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1 Introduction
The government in the United States and many other developed countries plays a crucial role
in the provision of old-age consumption. In the United States, for example, a major fraction of
the older population relies heavily on their social security income. Old-age benets provided
by the social security program are 40 percent of all income of older people. Moreover, these
benets are the main source of income for half of the older population.1 On the other hand, these
programs are a major source of cost for governments. In the United States, social security payouts
are 30 percent of total government outlays . The severity of these costs together with an aging
population has made reforms in the retirement system a necessity.
Various reforms have been proposed to reduce the cost of these programs or raise revenue to
fund them. Typically, these proposals only target reform of the payroll tax and old-age benets.
Moreover, with a few exceptions, they focus on gains to future generations and often ignore the
impact of reforms on current generations (see our discussion of related literature in section 1.1).
While such reforms have their merit, they require interpersonal comparison of utilities and are
not necessarily robust to the variety of the political arrangements through which these reforms
are determined. Alternatively, one can consider Pareto improving reforms: reforms that improve
everyone’s welfare. It is thus important to know under what conditions Pareto improving policy
reforms are feasible. Moreover, what policy instruments are essential in achieving such reforms
and how large are the eciency gains arising from these reforms?
In this paper, we propose a theoretical and quantitative analysis of Pareto improving policy
reforms which view payroll taxes, old-age benets, etc. as part of a comprehensive scal pol-
icy. On the theory side, we expand on Werning (2007) and provide a test of Pareto optimality
of a tax and transfer schedule in an overlapping-generation economy. We then use the theory
to investigate the possibility of Pareto optimal reforms in a quantitative model consistent with
aggregate and distributional features of the U.S. economy. Our main result is that earnings tax
reforms are not a major source of eciency gains in a Pareto optimal reform, but asset subsidies
play an essential role in producing eciency gains.
We use an overlapping-generation framework in which individuals of each cohort are het-
erogeneous in their earning ability, mortality and discount factor. We assume those with higher
earning ability have lower mortality. This assumption is motivated by vast empirical research
that documents a negative correlation between lifetime income and mortality (see, for exam-
ple, Cristia (2009); Waldron (2013)). We also assume higher-ability individuals are more patient.
The motivation for this assumption is the observed heterogeneity in savings rates across income
1Social security benets are more than 83 percent of the income for half of the older population (see Table 6 in
Poterba (2014)).
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groups (see, for example, Dynan et al. (2004)). This feature also allows us to match the distribution
of wealth in our calibration. Finally, annuity markets are incomplete.2
Our goal is to characterize the set of Pareto optimal scal policies, that is, non-linear earnings
tax and transfers during working age, asset taxes and social security benets. The evaluation
of scal policies is based on the allocations that they induce in a competitive equilibrium where
economic agents face these policies. In particular, a sequence of scal policies is Pareto optimal if
one cannot nd another sequence of policies whose induced allocations deliver the same welfare
to each type of individual in each generation at a lower resource cost.
In this environment, the key question is whether a Pareto optimal reform (henceforth “Pareto
reform”) is feasible. We show that, absent dynamic ineciencies, a Pareto reform is only possi-
ble when there are ineciencies within each generation. In other words, determining whether
a sequence of policies can be improved upon comes down to checking the same property within
each generation. An important implication of this result is that Pareto improvements cannot
be achieved by simply replacing distortionary tax policies. This is because in an economy with
heterogeneity, distortionary taxes may be ecient, as they serve a purpose: they balance redis-
tributive motives in a society with incentives. It is well known that the set of Pareto optimal
non-linear income taxes are potentially large.3 In other words, judgment about the Pareto opti-
mality of a tax system is not possible by simply examining the tax rates.
In order to examine the optimality of a given tax and transfer system, we extend the analysis
of Werning (2007) to our overlapping-generations economy and derive criteria for optimality for
each generation. A tax system is optimal if it satises two sets of criteria, one for the earnings
tax schedule and one for asset taxes. An earnings tax schedule meets the optimality criteria if
and only if it satises a set of inequality conditions (one at each age). These inequalities relate
the shape of the earnings tax schedule to the income distribution, elasticity of labor supply and
distribution of consumption in the economy. They imply that earnings taxes are more likely to
be inecient (i.e., fail to satisfy the inequalities) when labor supply elasticity is high or earnings
taxes are regressive (for some income range). The key idea is that if these inequalities are vio-
lated, it is possible to reduce the tax rate for some income groups without reducing tax revenue
collections.4 In particular, when the elasticity of labor supply is high or the tax schedule is re-
gressive, a decline in the marginal tax rate for a small interval of the income distribution can lead
to an increase in government revenue, which in turn can be used to improve everyone’s welfare.
Optimality of the asset tax schedule is tied to the variability of mortality and discount factor
2The private annuity market in the United States is small and plays a minor role in nancing retirement. See
Poterba (2001) and Benartzi et al. (2011) for surveys and various possible explanations.
3See Mirrlees (1971) and Werning (2007) for static examples.
4This is similar to a Laer eect: when taxes are linear, if the marginal tax rate is above the peak of the Laer
curve, a decline in the tax rate could lead to an increase in government revenue.
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across ability types, as well as the incompleteness in the annuity markets. In particular, optimal
asset taxes must have two components. First, they must have a subsidy component that cap-
tures the ineciencies arising from incompleteness in annuity markets. More specically, with
incomplete annuity markets, a subsidy to savings can index asset returns to individual mortality
rates and therefore complete the market. Second, optimal asset taxes must have a tax compo-
nent that stems from the increasing demand for savings from more productive individuals above
and beyond usual consumption-smoothing reasons. In eect, since more productive individuals
have a higher valuation for consumption in the future (due to their lower mortality and higher
discount factor), taxation of future consumption can relax redistributive motives by the govern-
ment, which in turn leads to lower taxes on earnings. The nature and magnitude of optimal asset
taxes is determined by the balance of these two eects.
With this theoretical characterization as a guide, we turn to a quantitative version of our
model. Specically, we calibrate our model economy to the status quo policies in the United
States (income taxes, payroll taxes and old-age transfers), aggregate measures of hours worked
and capital stock, and distribution of earnings and wealth. Our model can successfully match key
features of the U.S. data, particularly the cross-sectional distribution of earnings and wealth.
Using this quantitative model, we rst apply our Pareto optimality test to assess the optimality
of the status quo policies. Our tests show that these policies fail the eciency test described above.
While the earnings tax inequality is violated, our quantitative analysis shows that this violation
only occurs at the income levels close to the social security maximum earnings cap. In fact, since
marginal tax rates fall around this cap, the tax is regressive and thus fails the inequality criterion.
Beside this violation, earnings taxes pass our inequality test for all other levels of earning. On
the other hand, our test shows that the asset tax schedule violates our equality test at almost all
ages and for all income levels. This suggests that savings tax (or subsidy) reforms are a source of
gains as opposed to earnings tax reforms.
Next, we solve the problem of minimizing the cost of delivering the status quo welfare to each
individual in each generation (i.e., the welfare associated with allocations induced by the status
quo policies). The cost savings associated with this problem capture the potential eciency gains
in optimal reforms and identify the main elements of a Pareto optimal reform. This exercise con-
rms the results of the test: earnings taxes barely change compared to the status quo, while asset
taxes are negative and progressive; that is, assets must be subsidized and asset-poor individuals
must face a higher subsidy rate than asset-rich individuals.
That assets must be subsidized shows that the incompleteness in the annuity markets is the
primary source of welfare gains and that heterogeneity in mortality and discount rates play a
secondary role in determining asset taxes. Furthermore, since in our model, poorer individuals
have a higher mortality rate, they must face a higher subsidy in order for the return on their
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savings to be indexed to their mortality. This eect leads to progressive subsidies.
We conduct our quantitative exercises in two forms. First, we consider the steady state of an
economy with currently observed U.S. demographics. This exercise shows that asset subsidies
could be signicant. In particular, the average subsidy rate post-retirement is 5 percent. Overall,
implementing optimal policies reduces the present value of net resources used by each cohort by
15 percent. This is equivalent to a 2.21 percent reduction in the status quo consumption of all
individuals, keeping their welfare unchanged.5
Second, we consider an aging economy that experiences a fall in population growth and mor-
tality (as projected by the U.S. Census Bureau). In this economy, and along the demographic tran-
sition, we solve for Pareto optimal reform policies that do not lower the welfare of any individual
in any birth cohort relative to the status quo. Our numerical results concerning the transition
economy conrm our main ndings: assets subsidies are signicant and crucial in generating
eciency gains. However, the gains for each birth cohort are smaller relative to the previous
exercise. The present discount value of net resources used by each cohort in the new steady state
falls by about 5 percent. We distribute all the gains along the transition path to the initial gener-
ations in a lump-sum fashion. This amounts to a one-time lump-sum transfer of about 9 percent
of the current U.S. GDP.
In order to highlight the importance of asset subsidies, we conduct another quantitative ex-
ercise in which we restrict reforms to policies that do not include asset subsidies and old-age
transfers. In a sense, this is the best that can be achieved by phasing out retirement benets and
reforming payroll taxes. We nd that these policies do not improve eciency. In other words,
they deliver the status quo welfare at a higher resource cost than the status quo policies.
Asset subsidies are central to our proposed optimal policy. These subsidies resemble some
of the features of the U.S. tax code and retirement system. Tax breaks for home ownership,
retirement accounts (eligible IRAs, 401(k), 403(b), etc.), as well as subsidies for small business
development are a few examples of such programs, whose estimated cost was $367 billion in
2005 (about 2.8 percent of the GDP). Moreover, these programs mostly benet higher-income
individuals.6 One view of our proposed optimal policy is to extend and expand such policies to
include broader asset categories and, more importantly, continue during the retirement period.
Our result also highlights the need for progressivity in these subsidies, contrary to the current
observed outcome. An important feature of the U.S. tax code is that it penalizes the accumulation
of assets in tax-deferred accounts beyond the age of 70 and a half. Our analysis implies that
these features are at odds with the optimal policy prescribed by our model and their removal can
5In the steady state analysis, we do not take a stand on how these gains are distributed. For the economy in
transition, gains are distributed to initial generations.
6See Woo and Buchholz (2006).
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potentially yield signicant eciency gains.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to various strands in the literature on policy reform. We contribute to the
large and growing literature on retirement nancing, most of which studies the implications of
a specic set of policy proposals. For example, Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) study the eect
of privatization of social security. Kitao (2014) compares dierent combinations of tax increase
and benet cuts within the current social security system. McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming)
propose phasing out social security and Medicare benets and removing payroll taxes. Blandin
(2015) studies the eect of eliminating the social security maximum earnings cap. We depart from
the existing literature in two important aspects. First, we do not restrict the set of policies at the
outset. Therefore, our results can inform us about which policy instrument is an essential part
of a reform. As a result, we nd that changing the marginal tax rates on labor earnings is not
a major contributor to an optimal policy reform. Second, we focus explicitly on Pareto optimal
policies and derive the condition that can inform us about the feasibility of Pareto improving
policy reforms. In that regard, our paper is close to Conesa and Garriga (2008), who characterize
a Pareto optimal reform in an economy without heterogeneity within each cohort and nd Pareto
optimal linear taxes (a Ramsey exercise).
Our paper is also related to a large literature on optimal policy design. The common ap-
proach in this literature is to take stand on specic social welfare criteria and nd optimal poli-
cies that maximize social welfare. For example, Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Heathcote et al.
(2014) study the optimal progressivity of a tax formula for a parametric set of tax functions, while
Fukushima (2011), Huggett and Parra (2010) and Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015) do the same us-
ing a Mirrleesian approach that does not impose a parametric restriction on policy instruments
(similar to our paper). One drawback of this approach is that it relies on the choice of the social
welfare function. As a result, it is hard to separate the redistribution aspects of the optimal policy
from eciency gains. The benet of our approach is that it does not rely on a welfare function
and it takes the distribution of welfare in the economy as a given. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this is the rst paper that proposes this approach to optimal policy reform in a dynamic
quantitative setting.7
Our paper also contributes to the literature on dynamic optimal taxation over the life cy-
cle. Similar to Weinzierl (2011), Golosov et al. (forthcoming) and Farhi and Werning (2013b), we
provide analytical expressions for distortions and summarize insights from those expressions.
However, unlike these cited works, which focus on labor distortions over the life cycle, we focus
7See Werning (2007) for a theoretical analysis in a static framework.
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on intertemporal distortions. Furthermore, we emphasize the role of policy during the retirement
period, thus relating our work to Golosov and Tsyvinski (2006), who study the optimal design of
the disability insurance system, and Shourideh and Troshkin (2015), who focus on an optimal tax
system that provides incentive for an ecient retirement age.
Finally, our paper is related to the literature on the role of social security in providing longevity
insurance. Hubbard and Judd (1987), İmrohorogˇlu et al. (1995), Hong and Ríos-Rull (2007) and
Hosseini (2015) (among many others) have examined the welfare-enhancing role of providing
an annuity income through social security when the private annuity insurance market has im-
perfections. Caliendo et al. (2014) point out that the welfare-enhancing role of social security in
providing annuitization is limited because social security does not aect individuals’ intertempo-
ral trade-os. In this paper, we precisely point to the optimal distortions and policies that address
this shortcoming in the system by emphasizing that any optimal retirement system (whether pub-
lic, private or mixed) must include features that aect individuals’ intertemporal decisions on the
margin. In our proposed implementation, those features take the form of a nonlinear subsidy on
assets.
2 Pareto Optimal Policy Reforms: A Basic Framework
In this section, we use a basic framework to provide a theoretical analysis of Pareto optimal policy
reforms. In particular, we extend the techniques in Werning (2007) to an OLG economy in order
to characterize the determinants of a Pareto optimal policy reform.
To do so, we consider an OLG economy where the population in each cohort is heterogeneous
with respect to their preferences over consumption and leisure. In particular, suppose time is
discrete and indexed by t = 0, 1, · · · . There is a continuum of individuals born in each period.
Each individual lives for at most two periods. Upon birth, each individual draws a type θ ∈ Θ =[
θ, θ
]
from a continuous distribution H (θ) that has density h (θ). This type determines various
characteristics of the individual such as labor productivity, mortality risk and discount rate. We
assume that an individual’s preferences are represented by the following utility function over
bundles of consumption and hours worked, y/θ
U
(
c1, c2,
y
θ
)
= u (c1) + β (θ)P (θ)u (c2)− v
(y
θ
)
,
where β (θ) is the discount factor,P (θ) is mortality, θ is labor productivity, u (·) is strictly concave
and v (·) is strictly convex.8
8We could also dene utility over actual hours worked l = y/θ. We sometimes adopt this notation in the main
body of the paper.
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Production is done using labor and capital, with the production function given by a F (K,L),
where K is capital and L is total eective labor; for ease of notation, F (K,L) here is taken to be
NDP (net domestic product). In addition, population grows at rate n, and Nt is total population
at t.
Government policy is given by taxes and transfers paid during each period. Taxes and trans-
fers in the rst period depend on earnings, while in the second period, they depend on asset
holdings and earnings in the rst period. Thus, the individual maximization problem is
maxU
(
c1, c2,
y
θ
)
s.t.
c1 + qta = wty − Ty (wty)
c2 = (1 + rt+1) a− Ta ((1 + rt+1) a, wty) ,
where rt = FK,t (Kt, Lt) is the net return on investment after depreciation, whilewt = FL (Kt, Lt)
is the average wage rate in the economy. Note that in the above equations, we have allowed the
second period taxes, Ta (·, ·) , to depend on wealth and earnings, which can potentially capture
a redistributive and history-dependent social security benet formula together with taxes on as-
sets. In addition, we have imposed incomplete annuity markets. In particular, the price of assets
purchased when individuals are young is the same for all individuals, even though they could be
heterogeneous in their survival probability. This covers two possible scenarios: rst, annuities
are non-existent or qt = 1; second, annuities exist but the market suers from adverse selection,
in which case qt is the average probability of survival weighted by total annuity purchases by the
young individuals. These assumptions are consistent with the observation that annuity markets
in the United States are very small. Finally, we assume that upon the death of an individual, his
or her non-annuitized asset is collected by the government.
Given these tax functions and market structure, an allocation is a sequence of consumption,
assets and eective hours distributions, as well as aggregate capital over time represented by
{c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) , yt (θ) , at (θ)}θ∈Θ together with Kt and Lt, where subscript t represents the pe-
riod in which the individual is born, total Kt is capital in period t and Nt is total eective hours.
Such allocation is feasible if it satises the usual market clearing conditions:
Nt
∫
c1,t (θ) dH (θ) +Nt−1
∫
P (θ) c2,t−1 (θ) (θ) dH (θ) +Kt+1 = F
(
Kt, Nt
∫
yt (θ) dH (θ)
)
+Kt
Nt
∫
qtat (θ) dH (θ) = Kt.
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For any allocation, we refer to the utility of an individual of type θ born at t asWt (θ). For a given
set of taxes and initial stock of physical capital, we refer to the prole of utilities that arise in
equilibrium as induced by policies Ty, Ta.
In this context, for a given policy Ty,t (·) , Ta,t (·, ·) and its induced welfare prole, Wt (θ), a
Pareto reform is a sequence of policies Tˆy,t (·) , Tˆa,t (·, ·) whose induced welfare, Wˆt (θ), satises
Wˆt (θ) ≥ Wt (θ) with strict inequality for a positive measure of θ′s and some t. Notice that in
our denition of Pareto reforms, we allowed for policies to be time-dependent in order to have
exibility in the reforms. A pair of policies is thus said to be Pareto optimal if a Pareto reform
does not exist.
The following proposition shows our rst result about the existence of Pareto optimal reforms:
Proposition 1. (Diamond) Consider an allocation
{{cˆ1,t (θ) , cˆ2,t (θ) , yˆt (θ) , aˆt (θ)}θ∈Θ , Kt, Lt}
induced by a pair of policies Tˆa,t, Tˆy,t . Suppose that rt = FK (Kt, Lt)− n > γ for some positive γ;
then the pair Tˆa,t and Tˆy,t is Pareto optimal if and only if , for all t = 0, 1, · · ·
{cˆ1,t (θ) , cˆ2,t (θ) , yˆt (θ)}θ∈Θ ∈ arg max
c1(θ),c2(θ),y(θ)
∫ [
y (θ)− c1 (θ)− P (θ)
1 + rt+1
c2 (θ)
]
dH (θ) (P)
subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ
U
c1 (θˆ) , c2 (θˆ) , y
(
θˆ
)
θ

U
(
c1 (θ) , c2 (θ) ,
y (θ)
θ
)
≥ Wt (θ) .
Proof can be found in the appendix.
The above proposition is an extension of the results in Diamond (1965) to an environment
with heterogeneity. It states that when the economy is dynamically ecient, FK,t > n, then the
possibility of a Pareto optimal reform depends on whether tax and transfer schemes exhibit inef-
ciencies within some generation. To the extent that dynamic eciency seems to be the case in
the data, the only possible Pareto optimal reforms can come from within-generation inecien-
cies.9 Note that a usual asymmetric information assumption is imposed on allocations, to reect
that not all tax policies are feasible. In particular, tax policies that directly depend on individuals’
characteristics (e.g., ability types and mortality) are not available. We highlight the importance
of this result by considering three examples of exercises commonly used in the literature.
Example 1. Suppose there is no heterogeneity in ability (H (θ) is degenerate) and all individ-
uals survive to old age with probability 1 (therefore, there is no ineciency associated with an
9See Abel et al. (1989) for assessment of dynamic eciency in U.S. data.
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incomplete annuity market). Also, assume that taxes Ty and Ta are lump-sum taxes. This is the
classic example of Diamond (1965). Any changes in lump-sum taxes only aect intergenerational
transfers. In particular, removing these taxes causes the economy to converge to a new steady
state with a higher stock of capital. All the individuals born in the steady state are better o.
However, this comes at the cost of reducing the welfare of early generations. In fact, by Proposi-
tion 1, it is impossible to devise a Pareto improving transition, since there is no ineciency that
can be exploited.
Example 2. As before, consider an economy with degenerate θ but assume Ty is distortionary,
Ty = T0 + τyy. In this case, a Pareto improving policy reform is feasible. For example, it is
possible to reduce tax rate τy and adjust T0 to ensure the status quo welfare is delivered. Removing
ineciencies due to distortionary taxes allows a policy to improve the welfare of all current and
future generations. Many of the studies that show a Pareto improving transition from pay-as-you-
go social security to a fully funded system are similar to this example (e.g., Conesa and Garriga
(2008) and Birkeland and Prescott (2007)).
Example 3. Suppose there is heterogeneity in ability (H (θ) is not degenerate) and P (θ) = 1
for all θ. Further, assume Ty is a nonlinear, increasing and smooth tax function, and Ta is lump-
sum transfer. In other words, this is a heterogeneous-agent economy with nonlinear taxes and a
pay-as-you-go social security. In this case, the only possible ineciency can arise from inecient
nonlinear taxation. As is well-known from the public nance literature, the set of Pareto ecient
tax functions is large.10 This implies that distortionary taxes (payroll, earnings, etc.) cannot
necessarily be removed, since they could satisfy the condition in Proposition 1.
We refer to the above proposition as the principle of no-free-lunch in policy reform. It im-
plies that the possibility of a Pareto reform comes down to the eciency of a tax and transfer
schedule within each generation. To the extent that distortionary taxes (in the traditional sense
of the word) are not necessarily inecient, it is thus crucial to understand the determinants of
an ecient tax schedule. The following proposition provides these conditions:
Proposition 2. Suppose that v (l) = ψ l1+1/ε
1+1/ε
, where ε is the elasticity of labor supply. Then, a pair
of policies T˜y and T˜a is ecient only if it satises the following relationships:
1 + ε
ε
≥ −θ τ˜l,t (θ)
1− τ˜l,t (θ)
[
h′ (θ)
h (θ)
+
1
θ
+
τ˜ ′l,t (θ)
τ˜l,t (θ) (1− τ˜l,t (θ)) +
−u′′ (c1,t) c1,t (θ)
u′ (c1,t (θ))
c′1,t (θ)
c1,t (θ)
]
(1)
τ˜a,t (θ) = 1− qt
P (θ)
+
qt
P (θ)
θ
1 + 1/ε
τ˜l,t (θ)
1− τ˜l,t (θ)
(
β′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′ (θ)
P (θ)
)
, (2)
10See Mirrlees (1971) and Werning (2007).
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where τ˜l (θ) and τ˜a (θ) are the wedges induced by the tax schedule; and
τ˜l,t (θ) = 1− v
′ (yt/θ)
wtθu′ (c1,t (θ))
, τ˜a,t (θ) = 1− qtu
′ (c1,t (θ))
(1 + rt+1) β (θ)P (θ)u′ (c2,t (θ))
,
where the allocations are those induced by the policies.
In addition, if optimal allocations under the tax functions are fully characterized by an individ-
ual’s rst-order conditions, then the above are also sucient for eciency.
Proof can be found in the appendix.
The above proposition provides a test of Pareto optimality of a tax schedule. It extends the
results in Werning (2007) for a static economy to our two-period OLG setup. First, consider the
inequality (1). Intuitively, and as illustrated by Werning (2007), this inequality can be derived
by a tax perturbation. In particular, consider a small decline in the marginal labor tax rate for
an interval of the form [y (θ)− dy, y (θ)] accompanied by an increase in the marginal tax rate of
the same size for the interval [y (θ) , y (θ) + dy]. Since such a tax perturbation improves every-
one’s utility, if a tax schedule is to be Pareto optimal, this perturbation must reduce government
revenue.11
Consider the behavioral response of the individuals to such tax reform. The workers whose
income is initially in [y (θ)− dy, y (θ)] will increase their income, while the workers whose in-
come is in the interval [y (θ) , y (θ) + dy] will decrease their income. The response of each set of
workers depends on the elasticity of the labor supply and the curvature of the tax function. The
resulting change in government revenue is negative when the increase in the bottom subinterval
is smaller than the decrease in the top subinterval. Thus, the resulting change is more likely to
be negative (1) the higher is the rate of change in the skill distribution, i.e., if there are more peo-
ple in the interval [y (θ) , y (θ) + dy]; (2) the higher is the slope of the marginal tax rate, which
dampens the response of the bottom subinterval and increases the response of the individuals in
the top subinterval; (3) the stronger is the income eect; and (4) the lower is the Frisch elasticity
of labor supply. These forces can be identied in (1). An interesting observation is that when
taxes become regressive, i.e., τ ′l < 0, it is more likely that there is a Pareto improving reform.12
Equation (2) pertains to the optimality of asset taxes or intertemporal distortions induced by
T˜a. The formula has two components: a component that captures the ineciencies arising from
11The perturbation we describe here is more suited for a static economy, since in our setup it results in changes in
the agent’s saving behavior and aects government revenue from taxes in the second period. While this means that
the tax perturbation for the dynamic economy is more complicated, the intuition remains similar. We, thus, resort
to the standard perturbation in Werning (2007), although our perturbation is slightly dierent in marginal tax rates
as opposed to the tax level.
12As we will see in section 6.1, the main source of ineciency in the earnings tax schedule results from the sudden
drop of marginal tax rate around the social security maximum taxable earnings cap.
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the incompleteness of annuity markets, 1− qt/P (θ), and a component that captures the distor-
tions to the annuity margin. The rst component is standard, and it reects the fact that in the
absence of annuities, a subsidy to savings can provide annuity and thus complete the market. The
second component is more subtle and stems from the increasing demand for savings from more
productive individuals above and beyond usual consumption-smoothing reasons. In eect, since
more productive individuals have a higher valuation for consumption in the second period, tax-
ation of second-period consumption can relax redistributive motives by the government, which
in turn leads to lower taxes on earnings.13
Our analysis here points toward the key properties that can, in principle, provide sources of
gain for Pareto optimal reforms. Note that given the generality of our result, our analysis will
apply whether transitional issues in policies are considered or not. In other words, either taxes
are inecient, in which case one can always nd a rearrangement of resources across generations
and nd a possible Pareto improvement, or taxes are ecient, in which case it is impossible to
nd such an improvement.
To summarize, our analysis in this section highlights the conditions required for the existence
of a Pareto optimal reform. Proposition 1 states that in dynamically ecient economies, a policy
is Pareto optimal if it is Pareto optimal within each generation. This implies that the problem
of nding Pareto optimal policies can be solved separately across generations. Proposition 2
provides tests or conditions that any Pareto optimal policy must satisfy for each generation. In
section 4.2, we provide an extension of these test to the case of a multi-period OLG economy. We
then use this test in our quantitative model.
In what follows, we develop a quantitative model that does fairly well in matching basic
moments of consumption, earnings and wealth distribution. We will use this model to test for
potential ineciencies and calculate the magnitudes of the amount of cost savings that Pareto
optimal reforms can provide.
3 The Model
In this section, we develop a heterogeneous-agent overlapping-generations model that extends
the ideas discussed in section 2 and is suitable for our quantitative policy analysis. Our description
of the policy instruments is general and includes the current U.S. status quo policies as a special
case. The model is rich enough and is calibrated in section 5 to match U.S. aggregate data and
cross-sectional observations on earnings and asset distribution. In section 4, we show how this
13The literature on optimal taxation has typically used such an argument for positive (or non-zero) capital taxes.
However, the implied magnitudes are dierent across dierent papers. See for example Golosov et al. (2013), Piketty
and Saez (2013), Farhi and Werning (2013a) and Bellofatto (2015), among many others.
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model can be used to derive Pareto optimal policies.
3.1 Demographics, Preferences and Technology
Time is discrete and the economy is populated by J + 1 overlapping generations. A cohort of
individuals are born in each period t = 0, 1, 2, . . . . The number of newborn grows at rate nt.
Upon birth, each individual draws a type θ ∈ Θ = [θ, θ] from a continuous distribution H(θ)
that has density h (θ). This type parameter determines three main characteristics of an individual:
life-cycle labor productivity prole, survival rate prole, and discount factor. In particular, an
individual of type θ has labor productivity of ϕj(θ) at age j. We assume that ϕ′j (θ) > 0 and thus
refer to individuals with a higher value of θ as more productive. Everyone retires at age R, and
ϕj(θ) = 0 for j > R.
Moreover, an individual of type θ and of age j who is born in period t has a survival rate pj+1,t(θ)
(this is the probability of being alive at age j + 1, conditional on being alive at age j). Nobody
survives beyond age J (with pJ+1,t(θ) = 0 for all θ and t). As a result, the survival probability at
age j for those who are born in period t is
Pj,t (θ) = Π
j
i=0pi,t (θ) .
Additionally, an individual of type θ has a discount factor given by β (θ). Thus, that individual’s
preferences over streams of consumption and hours worked are given by
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj,t (θ) [u (cj,t)− v (lj,t)] . (3)
Here, cj,t (θ) and lj,t (θ) are consumption and hours worked for an individual of θ at j who is born
in period t.
We assume that the economy-wide production function uses capital and labor and is given
by F (Kt, Lt). In this formulation, Kt is aggregate per capita stock of capital and Lt is the ag-
gregate eective units of labor per capita. Eective labor is dened as labor productivity, ϕj (θ),
multiplied by hours, lj (θ). Its aggregate value is the sum of the units of eective labor across all
individuals alive in each period. In other words,
Lt =
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j)ϕj (θ) lj,t (θ) dH (θ) ,
where µt(θ, j) is the share of type θ of age j in the population in period t. Finally, capital depre-
ciates at rate δ. Therefore, the return on capital net of depreciation is FK (Kt, Lt)− δ.
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3.2 Markets and Government
We assume that individuals supply labor in the labor market and earn wagewt per unit of eective
labor. In addition, individuals have access to a risk-free asset. The assets of the deceased in each
period t convert to bequests and are distributed equally among the living population in period
t.14 Our main assumption here is that annuity markets do not exist. As discussed in section 2,
this assumption is in line with the observed low volume of trade in annuity markets in the United
States and other countries.15
The government uses non-linear taxes on earnings from supplying labor, including the social
security tax, while we assume that there is a linear tax on capital income and consumption. The
revenue from taxation is then used to nance transfers to workers and social security payments
to retirees. While transfers are assumed to be equal for all individuals, social security benets are
not and depend on individuals’ lifetime income.
Given the above market structure and government policies, each individual born in period t
faces a sequence of budget constraints of the following form:16
(1 + τc) cj + aj+1 = (wt+jϕjlj − Ty,j,t+j (wt+jϕjlj) + Trj,t+j)1 [j < R]
+ (1 + rt+j) aj − Ta,j,t+j ((1 + r) aj) + Sj,t+j (Et)1 [j ≥ R] +Bt+j.(4)
Here, rt+j is the rate of return on assets aj+1; Ty,j,t (·) and Ta,j,t (·) are the earnings tax and asset
tax functions, respectively; Trj,t are transfers to working individuals; Sj,t (·) is retirement benet
from the government; and Bt+j is income earned from bequests. The dependence of retirement
benets on lifetime earnings is captured in E , which is given by
Et = 1
R + 1
R∑
j=0
wt+jϕjlj.
All tax functions and transfers can potentially depend on age and birth cohort (e.g., along a de-
mographic transition).
There is a corporate tax rate τK paid by producers. Therefore, the return on assets, rt, is equal
to (1− τK) (FK (Kt, Lt)− δ). 17 We assume that the government taxes households’ holding of
14An alternative and equivalent specication is one where government collects all assets upon the death of indi-
viduals. Given the availability of lump-sum taxes and transfers, the way in which assets of the deceased are allocated
among the living agents does not change our results.
15See, for example, Benartzi et al. (2011), James and Vittas (2000) and Poterba (2001), among many others.
16To avoid clutter, we drop the explicit dependence of individual allocations on birth year, t, whenever there is no
risk of confusion.
17We interpret the tax rate τK as the eective marginal corporate tax rate on capital gains that captures all the
distortions caused by the corporate income tax code and capital gain taxes. Our optimal reform exercise does not
contain an overhaul of the capital tax schedule. As a result, in our economy, we take as a given the after-tax interest
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government debt at an equal rate and, therefore, the interest paid on government debt is also rt.
Given the above assumptions, the government budget constraint is given by
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j)Trj,tdH (θ) +
∫ J∑
j=R+1
µt (θ, j)Sj,t (Et−j (θ)) dH (θ) +Gt + (1 + rt)Dt =
τC
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j) cj,t−j (θ) dH (θ) +
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j)Ty,j,t (wtϕj (θ) lj,t−j (θ)) dH (θ) +
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j)Ta,j,t ((1 + rt) aj,t−j (θ)) dH (θ) + τK (FK (Kt, Lt)− δ) + (1 + nˆt+1)Dt+1, (5)
where Gt is per capita government purchases, Dt is per capita government debt, and nˆtis pop-
ulation growth rate at t which can be calculated as a function of mortality rates and nt. Finally,
goods and asset market clearing implies
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j) cj,t−j (θ) dH (θ) +Gt + (1 + nt+1)Kt+1 = F (Kt, Lt) + (1− δ)Kt, (6)
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j) pj+1,t−j (θ) aj+1,t−j (θ) dH (θ) = (1 + nˆt+1) (Kt+1 +Dt+1) , (7)
∫ J∑
j=0
µt (θ, j) (1− pj+1,t−j (θ)) aj+1,t−j (θ) dH (θ) = (1 + nˆt+1)Bt+1. (8)
Equilibrium. An equilibrium of this economy is dened as allocations where individuals
maximize (3) subject to (4), while government budget constraint (5), market clearings (6), (7)
and (8) must hold. The equilibrium is stationary (or in steady state) when all policy functions,
demographics parameters, allocations and prices are independent of calendar period t.
This sums up our description of the economy. In the next section, we describe our approach
to analyzing an optimal reform within the framework specied above. Note that we have not
specied any details about the status quo policies yet. We will do that in section 5 where we
impose detailed parametric specications of the U.S. tax and social security policies and calibrate
this model to the U.S. data. We can then apply our optimal reform approach to the calibrated
model and conduct our optimal reform exercise.
When the tax function and social security benets are calibrated to those for the United States,
we refer to the resulting equilibrium allocations and welfare as status quo allocations and welfare.
We refer to the status quo welfare of an individual of type θ who is born in period t by W sqt (θ).
rate earned on all types of assets.
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4 Optimal Policy Reform: Theoretical Framework
Our optimal policy-reform exercise builds on the positive description of the economy in section 3.
In particular, we use the distribution of welfare implied by the model in section 3 and consider a
planning problem that chooses policies in order to minimize the cost of delivering this distribution
of welfare, the utility prole {W sq (θ)}θ∈Θ, given the assumed set of policies and to a particular
representative cohort of individuals. The key benet of this approach is that it allows us not to
take a stand on the redistributional concerns inherent in the policy-making process. Thus the
change in the cost of such reforms is purely in terms of eciency gains and not redistributional
gains. For simplicity, we assume steady state and do not consider the changes in prices resulting
from the reforms. Later, in our quantitative exercise, we allow for both transitions and changes
in prices.
4.1 A Planning Problem
The set of policies that we allow for in our optimal reform are very similar to those described in
section 3. In particular, we allow for non-linear and age-dependent taxation of assets. Moreover,
we allow for non-linear and age-dependent taxation of earnings together with at social security
benets (i.e., social security benets are independent of lifetime earnings). Therefore, given any
tax and benet structure, each individual maximizes utility (3) subject to the budget constraints
(4).
The planning problem associated with the optimal reform nds the policies described above
to maximize the net revenue for the government (i.e., present value of receipts net of expenses). In
this maximization, the government is constrained by the optimizing behavior by individuals—as
described above, the feasibility of allocations and the requirement that each individual’s utility
must be aboveW sq (θ). We also focus on the steady state problem for the government and ignore
issues related to transition.
Implementability. We use the primal approach a la Lucas and Stokey (1983) to solve the
optimal reform problem. The primal approach transforms the problem of nding optimal policies
to that of nding optimal allocations. However, due to the optimizing behavior and the fact
that policies cannot depend on individual characteristics, the optimizing behavior by individuals
imposes a constraint on the planning problem. This constraint can be written solely in terms of
individual allocations and is described by the following lemma:
Lemma 1. Consider an allocation {cj (θ) , lj (θ)} that maximizes individual preferences (3) subject
to the constraints (4) for a given set of taxes. LetU (θ) be the utility associated with such an allocation.
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Then we must have
U ′ (θ) =
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
[
ϕ′j (θ) lj (θ)
ϕj (θ)
v′(lj (θ))
]
(9)
+
J∑
j=0
(
jβ′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
)
β (θ)j Pj (θ) [u (cj (θ))− v (lj (θ))] .
The proof can be found in the appendix.
Equation (9) is the envelope condition associated with the individual optimization problem
of maximizing (3) subject to the budget constraint (4). We refer to (1) as the implementability
constraint. This constraint is reminiscent of the local incentive compatibility constraint in the
New Dynamic Public Finance and mechanism design literature. In fact, if instead of solving the
policy problem described above, one solves the mechanism design problem when θ is private
information, the exact same constraint is derived.
However, it remains to be shown that if an allocation satises (9), it must be the solution of
individual optimization given some set of tax functions. Unfortunately, we cannot theoretically
prove this result. In the appendix, we show that if an allocation satises (9) and certain mono-
tonicity conditions, then a set of tax functions can be constructed so that the allocations satisfy
the rst-order conditions associated with the individual optimization and budget constraints.
Planning Problem. Our planning problem maximizes the revenue from delivering a steady-
state allocation subject to the implementability constraint (9) and a minimum utility requirement
given by
max
∫ J∑
j=0
Pj (θ)
(1 + r)j
[ϕj (θ) lj (θ)− cj (θ)] dH (θ) (10)
subject to
U (θ) =
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ) [u (cj (θ))− v (lj (θ))] (11)
U ′ (θ) =
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
ϕ′j (θ) lj (θ)
ϕj (θ)
v′(lj (θ)) (12)
+
J∑
j=0
(
jβ′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
)
βjPj (θ) [u (cj (θ))− v (lj (θ))]
U (θ) ≥ W sq (θ) . (13)
The objective in the above optimization problem is equal to the present discounted value of gov-
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ernment tax receipts net of outlays from a given cohort of individuals.18
4.2 Ecient Distortions
Our analysis of optimal taxes can be informed by studying the wedges implied by the solution to
the above planning problem. By this, we mean the magnitude of distortions to the individuals’
trade-o between consumption and earnings, and consumption across periods. These are useful
statistics about optimal allocation that inform us about the properties of optimal taxes.
The distortion to the consumption-earning margin or the labor wedge for each individual of
type θ is dened by
τlabor,j (θ) = 1−
v′ (lj (θ))
ϕj (θ)u′ (cj (θ))
. (14)
Intuitively, τlabor,j (θ) is the fraction of earnings on the margin that is taken away from the
individual in terms of period j consumption.
The wedge to the allocation of consumption across periods is less straightforward to dene.
In particular, the denition of distortions depends on the type of asset held by the individual.
Two types of assets are of particular interest:
1. A non-contingent asset that pays a return 1 + r independent of the individual’s survival,
for which the wedge is dened by
τsavings,j (θ) = 1−
u′ (cj (θ))
β (θ) (1 + r)pj+1 (θ)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
. (15)
We refer to this as savings wedge.
2. An annuity that pays a return 1 + r only in case of survival and is priced at an actuarially
fair price, pj+1 (θ), given by
τannuity,j (θ) = 1−
u′ (cj (θ))
β (θ) (1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
, (16)
which we refer to as the annuity wedge. The above can be interpreted as a tax imposed on
income from an annuity purchased at the actuarially fair price of pj+1(θ)
1+r
.
Note that the above wedges are hypothetical, since we do not allow for annuity holdings in our
18Our planning problem is related to the one solved by Huggett and Parra (2010). There, the authors take the
present discounted value of tax and transfers to a generation in the status quo economy as a given and nd an
allocation that maximizes the utilitarian social welfare function that costs no more than the status quo allocation
(in terms of present discounted value of net transfers to a generation). Our planning problem, instead, takes the
distribution of welfare in the status quo economy as a given and nds the least costly way of delivering that welfare.
18
implementation. Nevertheless, they are informative in terms of separating the dierent roles that
taxes play: incentive provision versus insurance.
The following lemma characterizes the optimal labor wedge:
Lemma 2. The labor wedges implied by the ecient allocation are given by
τlabor,j (θ)
1− τlabor,j (θ)
=
ϕ′j (θ)
ϕj (θ)
1−H (θ)
h (θ)
(
1
εF,j (θ)
+ 1
)
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−H(θ)
h(θ)
(
P
′
j
Pj
+ j β
′
β
) (17)
where
g (θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0(θ))
u′ (c0(θ′))
[1− γ (θ′)u′ (c0(θ′))] dH (θ
′)
1−H (θ) , (18)
εF,j (θ) =
v′(lj(θ))
v′′(lj(θ))lj(θ)
is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and γ (θ) is the multiplier on the con-
straint (13).
Proof can be found in the appendix.
The above formula is the familiar one from the static optimal taxation literature as in Mirrlees
(1971), Diamond (1998) and Saez (2001). The rst term in (17) captures the tail property of the
distribution at a given age, t. Intuitively, if the marginal tax for type θ increases at age j, it leads
to a marginal output loss of ϕj (θ)h(θ). However, it relaxes the incentive constraints on all the
types above at age j (captured by ϕ′j (θ) (1−H(θ))). The second term is capturing the behavioral
response to taxes. The higher the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the larger the response to
higher taxes. Finally, the last term is the social marginal welfare weight (see Piketty et al. (2014))
and captures the redistributive motive of the government. The key dierence between the above
formula and the standard Mirrlees-Diamond-Saez formula is that the marginal social value of
redistribution must be adjusted by mortality and discount factor heterogeneity. The intuition for
this adjustment can be understood by inspecting the incentive constraint in (9). When survival
and discount factor are positively correlated with labor productivity, utilities provided—either via
leisure or consumption—in older ages tighten the incentive constraint more than those in earlier
ages, due to heterogeneity in discount factor and survival probabilities. This, in turn, increases
the dead-weight loss of redistributive taxation. As a result, distortions must grow with age in
order to relax the incentive constraint. In other words, utilities should be front-loaded while
distortions should be back-loaded. The denominator in the term
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−H(θ)
h(θ)
(
P ′j
Pj
+ j β
′
β
)
captures this eect.
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We now turn to the characterization of annuity wedges. Then, the characterization of the
savings wedge will be straightforward. We have the following proposition:
Proposition 3. The annuity wedge is given by
τannuity, j (θ) =
(
p′j+1 (θ)
pj+1 (θ)
+
β′ (θ)
β (θ)
)
1−H (θ)
h (θ)
g (θ)
1− g (θ) 1−H(θ)
h(θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′(θ)
β(θ)
) , (19)
where g (θ) is given by (18). The annuity wedge is positive if survival and discount rates are positively
correlated with labor productivity, i.e., p′j+1 (θ) > 0, β
′ (θ) > 0.
Proof can be found in the appendix.
Note we can rewrite this equation approximately as
τannuity, j (θ) ≈
1−H (θ)
h (θ)
g (θ)
(
p′j+1 (θ)
pj+1 (θ)
+
β′ (θ)
β (θ)
)
. (20)
Intuitively, the idea behind the optimal tax on annuity income is similar to that of labor income
taxes. That is, productive individuals have an incentive to under-save in response to transfers in
the future. As a result, taxation of savings at lower levels prevents productive individuals from
under-saving and leads to a lower dead-weight loss of redistribution.
The distortions to savings, risk-free and non-contingent on death, can be calculated from the
annuity wedge provided above. In particular,
1− τsavings,j (θ) = (1− τannuity,j (θ))
pj+1 (θ)
.
We can write the above approximately as
τsavings,j ≈ τannuity,j − (1− pj+1) . (21)
The above formula illustrates the forces for optimal tax or subsidies on savings. In other words,
the presence of survival and discount rate heterogeneity creates forces toward taxation of savings,
while market incompleteness leads to subsidizing savings. Our quantitative exercise in section 6
claries the magnitude of each of these forces.
4.3 Test of Pareto Optimality
We now extend the results of Proposition 2 in section 2 and derive the conditions for a Pareto
optimality of any tax system. For any tax policy (not necessarily optimal), let the intratemporal
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distortion τlabor,j (θ) be dened by equation (17). Also let the distortion to (non-contingent) sav-
ings τsaving,j (θ) be dened by equation (21). Let ε be the elasticity of labor supply and σ be the
coecient of risk aversion. For ease of exposition, dene
Aj (θ) =
τlabor,j(θ)
1−τlabor,j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
ϕj,θ(θ)
ε
1+ε
1 +
(
τlabor,j(θ)
1−τlabor,j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
ϕj,θ(θ)
ε
1+ε
)(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′(θ)
β(θ)
) ,
B0 (θ) =
h′ (θ)
h (θ)
+
τ ′labor,0 (θ)
(1− τlabor,0 (θ)) τlabor,0 (θ) +
ϕ0,θ (θ)
ϕ0 (θ)
− ϕ0,θθ (θ)
ϕ0,θ (θ)
+ σ
c′0 (θ)
c0 (θ)
,
Cj (θ) =
Pj+1 (θ)
Pj (θ)
,
Dj (θ) =
1−τlabor,0(θ)
τlabor,0(θ)
ϕ0,θ(θ)
ϕ0(θ)
1+ε
ε
−
(
P ′j+1(θ)
Pj+1(θ)
+ (j + 1)β
′(θ)
β(θ)
)
1−τlabor,0(θ)
τlabor,0(θ)
ϕ0,θ(θ)
ϕ0(θ)
1+ε
ε
−
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′(θ)
β(θ)
) .
The following proposition provides the conditions under which a given set of policies are ecient.
Proposition 4. A tax policy {Ty,j, Ta,j, Sj} is ecient only if it satises the following conditions:
−Aj (θ) ·B0 (θ) ≤ 1, (22)
Cj (θ)
(
1− τsaving,j (θ)
)
= Dj (θ) . (23)
In addition, if optimal allocations under the tax functions are fully characterized by individuals’
rst-order conditions, then the above conditions are also sucient for eciency.
The proof is in the appendix.
Note that, for j = 0, inequality (22) is identical to (1), derived in section 2. Therefore, the
intuition for the test of the earnings taxes is similar to the one provided in section (2). As for
the test of asset taxes, the ideas are similar to the two-period model. On the one hand, asset
taxes must reect distributional concerns that lead to positive taxes; this is captured in the term
Dj (θ).19 On the other hand, asset taxes must address the incompleteness of the annuity market
and thereby subsidize savings; this is captured by the term Cj (θ).
Optimal Taxes So far, we have mainly focused on optimal allocations and wedges. It is possible
to construct taxes whose marginals coincide with the wedges described above. In the appendix,
we provide a monotonicity condition which if satised implies the existence of tax functions
that implement the ecient allocation. This monotonicity condition is a condition on allocations
19As mentioned in Section (2), this is similar to the eect identied by Saez (2002) and Golosov et al. (2013) among
others.
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that result from the planning problem. While we have no way of theoretically checking that
the monotonicity conditions are satised, our numerical simulations always involve a check that
ensures that these conditions are indeed satised. Needless to say, in all of our simulations the
monotonicity constraints are satised.
5 Calibration
In order to conduct our policy experiments, we need parametric specications and parameter val-
ues for the model described in section 3. We will estimate some of the parameters independently
(e.g., wage/productivity proles or mortality proles). We choose the rest of the parameters (e.g.,
discount factor) so that the model matches some targets in the U.S. data. We describe these details
below.
Earning ability proles. Individual productivity ϕj(θ) has two components: a deterministic
age-dependent component ϕ˜j and a type-dependent xed eect θ. We assume
ϕj(θ) = θϕ˜j,
with the age-dependent component given by
log ϕ˜t = ξ0 + ξ1 · j + ξ2 · j2 + ξ3 · j3.
To estimate the productivity parameters, we follow a large part of the literature (e.g., Altig et al.
(2001), Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and Shourideh and Troshkin (2015)) and use the eective
reported labor earnings per hour as a proxy for ϕj(θ). We calculate this as the ratio of all reported
labor earnings to total reported hours. For labor earnings, we use the sum over a list of variables
on salaries and wages, separate bonuses, the labor portion of business income, overtime pay,
tips, commissions, professional practice or trade payments and other miscellaneous labor income
converted to constant 2000 dollars. We use the data in Heathcote et al. (2010), who carefully
address a number of well-known issues in the raw data. The estimated parameters are ξ0 = 0.879,
ξ1 = 0.1198, ξ2 = −0.00171 and ξ3 = 7.26× 10−6.
Moreover, we assume the type-dependent xed eect θ has a Pareto-lognormal distribution
with parameters (µθ, σθ, aθ). This distribution approximates a lognormal distribution with pa-
rameters µθ and σθ at low incomes and a Pareto distribution with parameter aθ at high values. It
therefore allows for a heavy right tail at the top of the ability and earning distribution. For this
reason, it is commonly used in the literature (see Golosov et al. (forthcoming), Badel and Huggett
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Table 1: Death Rates by Lifetime Earnings Deciles for Males Age 67–71
Lifetime Earnings Decilesa
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th
Deaths (per 1000) 369 307 286 205 204 211 204 167 142 97
asource: Waldron (2013)
(2014) and Heathcote and Tsujiyama (2015)).20 We choose the tail parameter and variance param-
eter to be aθ = 3 and σθ = 0.6, respectively. The location parameter is set to µθ = −1/aθ so
that log θ has mean 0. With these parameters, the cross-section variance of log hourly wages in
the model is 0.36. Also, the ratio of median hourly wages to the bottom decile of hourly wages is
2.3. These statistics are consistent with the reported facts on cross-section distribution of hourly
wages in Heathcote et al. (2010).
Demographics and Mortality Proles. Population growth nt is constant and is equal to 1
percent. Individuals start earning income at age 25, they all retire at age 65, and nobody survives
beyond 100 years of age. Each individual has a Gompertz force of mortality
Mj (θ) =
η0
θη1
(
exp (η2j)
η2
− 1
)
. (24)
The Gompertz distribution is widely used in the actuarial literature (see, for example, Hori-
uchi and Coale (1982)) and economics (see, for example, Einav et al. (2010)). The second term in
equation (24) determines the changes in mortality by age and is common across all types. The
rst term is decreasing in θ and shifts mortality age proles. Therefore, a higher-ability person
has a lower mortality at all ages. The key parameter is η1, which determines how mortality varies
with ability. To choose this parameter, we use data on mortality across lifetime earning deciles
reported in Waldron (2013). She uses Social Security Administration data to estimate mortal-
ity dierentials at ages 67–71 by lifetime earnings decile. Table 1 shows the estimated annual
mortality rates for 67- to 71-year-old males born in 1940. This piece of evidence points to large
dierences in death rates across dierent income groups, with the poorest deciles almost 4 times
more likely to die than the richest decile. We use this data to calibrate parameter η1.
Parameter η2 is chosen to match the average survival probability from cohort life tables for
the Social Security area by year of birth and sex for males of the 1940 birth cohort (table 7 in
Bell and Miller (2005)). Finally, η0 is chosen so that mortality at age 25 is 0. The parameters that
give the best t to the mortality data in Table 1 and average mortality data are η0 = 0.0006,
20See Reed and Jorgensen (2004) for more details on Pareto-lognormal distribution, its properties and relation to
other better-known distributions.
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Figure 1: Fit of the mortality model. The top panel shows the average survival probability in the
model vs. social security data. The bottom panel shows death rates at age 67 in the model vs.
those reported in Waldron (2013).
η1 = 0.5545 and η2 = 0.0855. Figure 1 shows the t of the model in terms of matching mortality
across lifetime earnings decile in Waldron (2013). Once we have the mortality hazard Mj (θ), we
can nd the survival probability Pj (θ) = exp (−Mj (θ)).
Using this parametrization, there are 4 workers per each retiree in the steady state. This is
consistent with U.S. Census Bureau estimates.21
Preferences. We assume a constant relative risk aversion over consumption, u (c) = c1−σ−1
1−σ ,
and constant Frisch elasticity for disutility over hours worked, v (l) = ψ l1+
1
ε
1+ 1
ε
. The risk aversion
parameter is σ = 1.5 and the elasticity of labor supply is ε = 0.5. The weight of leisure in utility
ψ is chosen so that, in the model, the average number of annual hours worked is 2000.
To capture the heterogeneity in the discount factor across dierent-ability types, we assume
β (θ) = β0 · θβ1 .
21http://www.census.gov/population/projections/data/national/2014.html
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Figure 2: Tax functions. The left panel is the calibrated HSV tax function, THSV (·). The right
panel is the eective tax function (including HSV tax, payroll tax and transfers). The discontinuity
is due to social security cap on taxable earnings.
We choose β0 to match the wealth to income ratio of 3. The other parameter, β1, determines the
degree of heterogeneity in the discount factor. The larger β1 is, the larger is the dispersion in the
discount factor across ability types. We choose this parameter to match the wealth Gini index in
SCF (1989) data.
The aggregate production function is Cobb-Douglas with a capital share parameter α = 0.36,
and the depreciation rate is δ = 0.06.22 There is a corporate income tax rate of τK = 0.33 paid
by the rms. Therefore, after tax, the return on assets is r = 0.04.23 This is also the interest rate
that government pays on its debt.
Social security. Social security taxes are levied on labor earnings, up to a maximum taxable, as
in the actual U.S. system. Benets are paid as a nonlinear function of the average taxable earnings
over lifetime.24 Let e be labor earnings and emax be maximum taxable earnings. We set emax equal
to 2.47 times the average earnings in the economy, E¯. The social security tax rate is τss = 0.124.25
There is also a Medicare tax rate,τm = 0.029, which applies to the entire earnings.
Each individual’s benets are a function of that individual’s average lifetime earnings (up
22Therefore, with a capital to output ratio of 3, the steady state ratio of investment to GDP is 0.21, which is aligned
with the U.S. average over the period 2000–2010.
23This is consistent with the average real return to stock and long-term bonds over the period 1946–2001 as
reported in Siegel and Coxe (2002), Tables 1-1 and 1-2.
24The Social Security Administration uses only the highest 35 years of earnings to calculate the average lifetime
earnings. We use the entire earnings history, for easier computation.
25We account for disability insurance tax and benets by aggregating them with social security.
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Table 2: Parameters Chosen Outside the Model
Parameter Description Values/source
Demographics
J maximum age 75 (100 years old)
R retirement age 40 (65 years old)
n population growth rate 0.01
Hj(θ) mortality hazard see text
Preferences
σ risk aversion parameter 1.5
ε elasticity of labor supply 0.5
Labor Productivity
σθ Pareto-lognormal variance parameter 0.6
aθ Pareto-lognormal tail parameter 3
µθ Pareto-lognormal location parameter -0.33
Technology
α capital share 0.36
δ depreciation rate 0.06
Government policies
τSS, τm social security and Medicare tax rates 0.124,0.029
Ssq social security benet formula see text
τc consumption tax 0.055
τ , λ parameters of income tax function 0.151,4.74a
G government purchases 9% of GDP
D government debt 50% of GDP
aSource: Heathcote et al. (2014)
to emax). We use the same benet formula that the U.S. Social Security Administration uses to
determine the primary insurance amount (PIA) for retirees:
Ssq (E) =

0.9× E E ≤ 0.2E¯
0.18E¯ + 0.33× (E − 0.2E¯) 0.2Y¯ < E ≤ 1.24E¯
0.5243E¯ + 0.15× (E − 1.24E¯) E > 1.24E¯
.
To account for Medicare benets, we assume each individual in retirement will receive an
additional transfer independent of that individual’s earnings history. We choose this value so
that the aggregate Medicare benets are 3 percent of the GDP.26
26Our analysis abstracts from the health expenditure risks that this program helps to insure. In this regard, it is
similar to Huggett and Ventura (1999). Our approach can be applied to a more detailed model that includes these
risks as well as a more detailed model of Medicare benets. We leave this for future research.
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Table 3: Parameters Calibrated Using the Model
Parameters Description Values
β0 discount factor: level 0.975
β1 discount factor: elasticity w.r.t θ 0.01
ψ weight on leisure 0.74
Targeted Moments Data Model
Wealth-income ratio 3 3
Wealth Gini 0.78 0.78
Average annual hours 2000 2000
Tax functions and government purchases. In addition to social security, the government has
an exogenous spendingG, which we assume to be 9 percent of the GDP.27 There is a consumption
tax τC and a nonlinear tax on labor income. We use 5.5 percent for consumption tax as calculated
in McDaniel (2007). For the income tax function, we use
THSV (y) = y − λy1−τ ,
where y is the taxable income. During the working age, the taxable income for each individual
is wϕj(θ)lj(θ)− 0.5Tss, in which wϕj(θ)lj(θ) is labor earnings and Tss is the social security and
Medicare payroll taxes that the worker pays. The second term reects the eective tax credit in-
dividuals get for the portion of social security tax paid by their employers. We assume retirement
benets are not taxed.
The tax function of this form is extensively used to approximate the eective income taxes
in the United States. The parameter τ determines the progressivity of the tax function, while λ
determines the level (the lower φ is, the higher are the total tax revenues for a given τ ). Heathcote
et al. (2014) estimate a value of 0.151 for τ , based on PSID income data and income tax calculations
using NBER’s TAXSIM program. We use their estimated value for τ and choose λ. We refer to
this tax function as HSV tax function. The left panel in Figure 2 illustrates the resulting marginal
and average taxes as functions of annual earnings in constant 2000 dollars.
Finally, we assume government debt to be 50 percent of the GDP.28 The transfers Tr are such
that the government budget constraint (equation (5)) is satised in stationary equilibrium. In our
calibrated model, we follow McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) and assume all individuals face
the same after-tax interest rate regardless of their income (and therefore asset taxes are equal to
27This is the sum of all government consumption expenditure on national defense, general public service, public
order and safety, and economic aairs in NIPA Table 3.16. We use the average over the period 2000 to 2010.
28This is the sum of the state and local municipal securities and federal treasury securities. We use the average
over the period from 2000 to 2010.
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Figure 3: Fit of the distribution of earnings (left panel) and wealth (right panel).
0).29
To summarize, individuals face three dierent types of taxes on their income: HSV nonlinear
tax, social security payroll tax (subject to a maximum taxable cap) and Medicare tax. In addition,
they receive the transfer Tr prior to retirement. The right panel in Figure 2 shows the resulting
marginal and average tax on the sum of all these taxes and transfers. The discontinuity in the
marginal tax is due to social security’s maximum taxable earnings cap.
Calibration results Table 2 lists the parameters that are either taken from other studies, or
estimated or calculated independent of the model structure. Their sources and estimation or
calculation procedures are outlined in the previous paragraphs. Table 3 lists the parameters that
are calibrated using the model by matching some moments in the U.S. data. The top panel lists
parameter values. The bottom panel shows the targeted moments in data and resulting values in
the model.
As a check of the model’s ability to capture the extent of inequality in the data, we compute the
concentration of earnings and wealth in the model and compare them with the data. The results
are presented in Figure 3. The left panel shows the concentration of earnings. The dashed line
shows the commutative share of earnings at each commutative population share for individuals
age 25 to 60 in CPS (1994). The solid line shows the same measure in the model. Overall, the
model does a good job at capturing the extent of earnings inequality in the data. The Gini index
of earnings is 0.41 in the model and 0.46 in the data. Moreover, the model is able to capture the
29As McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) point out, most of the capital income is earned on assets in untaxed
or tax-deferred accounts.
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concentration on earnings at the top. The share of earnings of the top 1 percent is 8 percent
in the model and 6 percent in the data. This is achieved through the use of a Pareto-lognormal
distribution for ability distribution (even though we did not directly target this moment).
Finally, the right panel in Figure 3 shows the concentration of wealth. The dashed line is the
cumulative share of wealth owned by each cumulative population share in SCF (1989). The model
matches the Gini index of wealth by construction (see Table 3). Heterogeneity in the discount
factor allows us to generate a high concentration of wealth in the model. The share of wealth
owned by the top 1 percent is 23 percent in the model and 29 percent in the data.
6 Quantitative Results: Steady State
In this section we apply the tools developed in section 4 to our calibrated economy described in
section 5. We rst make a case for policy reforms by demonstrating that status quo policies fail the
Pareto optimality tests derived in Proposition 4. We then use the procedure outlined in section 4.3
to solve for optimal policies that implement ecient distortions in the economy. Finally, we report
the eect that an optimal reform has on individual choices, macro aggregates and government
budget. Note that our optimal policies minimize the present value of consumption net of labor
income for each generation. We report the reduction in this cost as a measure of eciency gains
from optimal reform policies.
Two points are worth emphasizing about our exercise: First, the eciency gains from our
Pareto optimal policy reforms can be redistributed across individuals in various ways. In this
section, we do not specify how the gains are distributed. In the next section, we provide one way
to distribute these gains to a subset of the population. Second, since it is important to disentangle
the partial and general equilibrium eects of the reform, in section (6.1)-(6.4), we assume that
prices—interest rates and wages—are xed at the status quo level. In sections 6.5 and 7, we report
the results with endogenous factor prices.
6.1 Test of Pareto Optimality
We start our analysis by testing the Pareto optimality of the status quo allocations. We do this
by computing the intertemporal and intratemporal distortions for the status quo allocations and
checking the inequality (22) and equation (23).
The left hand side of inequality (22) is depicted in Figure 4 (left panel) for ages j = 25, 35, 45.
As the gure illustrates, this term is below 1 for most ability types (each lifetime unit of earnings
corresponds to an ability type). The inequality only fails to hold over a small range for all ages.
This is where eective earnings taxes are regressive, due to the social security maximum taxable
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Figure 4: Test of Pareto optimality for status quo policies. The left panel is the test of earnings
tax schedule. The black lines are the left hand side of inequality (22). The test fails only at the
social security maximum taxable earnings’ cap. The right panel is the test of asset tax. The black
lines are the right hand side of Equation (23). The red lines are the left hand side of that equation
(equal to survival rate). This test fails everywhere.
earnings cap (see Figure 2). In this range, the term τ ′labor,0 (θ) is a large negative number. This
pushes the left hand side of inequality (22) up. This gure illustrates one of our main ndings:
that earnings taxes are not a large source of ineciency of the tax code.
We now examine asset taxes. We plot the left hand side (drawn in red) and right hand side
(drawn in black) of Equation (23) separately in Figure 4 (right panel) for ages j = 65, 75, 85. With
τsavings,j (θ) = 0, these are simply survival rates at each age. The right hand side of the equation is
driven by the gradient of survival with respect to ability,P ′j (θ), and the gradient of discount factor
with respect to ability, β′ (θ). Note that in an ecient tax schedule,Cj
(
1− τsavings,j
)
andDj must
coincide. The graph, thus, identies large deviations from eciency for asset taxes. Moreover, it
suggests that a potentially large subsidy is required in order to equate Cj
(
1− τsavings,j
)
with Dj .
This implies that the market incompleteness eect (captured by Cj) is more important than the
redistributional eect (captured by Dj) in shaping optimal asset taxes.
In summary, our tests provide two main results: rst, earnings taxes pass the Pareto optimality
tests to a great extent, except around the social security earnings cap; second, asset taxes strongly
fail the Pareto optimality tests. This result suggests that in a reform, the focus must be on asset
taxes as opposed to earnings taxes. Our numerical results below conrm this intuition.
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Figure 5: Optimal labor income tax functions. The left panel shows marginal taxes, while the
right panel shows average taxes. The black dashed line is the eective status quo tax schedule.
6.2 Optimal Policies
We solve for optimal policies using the planning problem 10 outlined in section 4. These are
(1) non-linear, age-dependent taxes on assets upon survival, Ta,j ((1 + r) aj); (2) non-linear, age-
dependent taxes on labor income, Ty,j (yj); (3) transfers to workers before retirement, Trj ; and
(4) transfers to workers after retirement, Sj . Note that transfers are independent of individual
choices but they do depend on age. Note also that the level of transfers and assets of households
is not uniquely determined, due to the presence of lump-sum transfers.30 As a result, we choose
transfers such that the lowest-ability type chooses not to hold any asset. Moreover, we assume
that individuals face linear consumption taxes. We x the consumption tax rate at the calibrated
level for the status quo economy. This assumption makes comparing labor income taxes across
economies straightforward.31 Finally, we x the corporate tax rate at the calibrated status quo
level. This implies that the pre-tax return on assets is the same in the status quo economy and
optimal reform.
Figure 5 shows the optimal marginal and average labor income tax functions for ages j =
25, 35, 45 (solid lines). We also plot the status quo tax functions for comparison (dashed lines).
Notice that except for the region where there is a sharp drop in the status quo tax rates (due to
social security maximum taxable earnings), the optimal taxes are very close to those in the status
quo. Furthermore, there is little age dependence in the optimal labor income taxes. These results
30 This feature resembles Ricardian equivalence.
31As in any optimal tax exercise, we can uniquely determine the intratemporal (labor) wedges. Consumption taxes
and labor income taxes are not separately pined down.
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Figure 6: Optimal asset tax functions. The left panel shows marginal taxes over all asset levels at
ages 65, 75 and 85, while the right panel shows average marginal rates at each age from 65 to 85.
The dashed line is the population mortality index.
imply that there is little room for improvement in eciency by reforming labor income taxes. In
essence, our exercise conrms the insight from the Pareto optimality tests performed in section
6.1 regarding earnings taxes.
The left panel of Figure 6 shows optimal marginal taxes (subsidies) on assets for ages j =
65, 75, 85. Since mortality is larger for asset-poor individuals, the rates are larger for these indi-
viduals at all ages. On the other hand, asset-rich individuals have higher ability, and hence lower
mortality. The ineciency due to the absence of an annuity market is smaller for these individ-
uals; therefore, asset subsidies are smaller (taxes are higher). In this sense, optimal asset taxes
(subsidies) are progressive. Figure 6 also illustrates that subsidies are large, around 5 percent, and
thus can play an important role in provision of retirement benets by the government.
The right panel shows the average marginal rates at each age from 65 to 85 years in com-
parison to the average mortality of the population. The dierence between the two implies that
rst, progressivity of the subsidies is signicant and cannot be ignored; second, policies are above
and beyond completing the annuity market, as would be the case in a world were mortality was
observed by the government.
As before, the implied magnitudes of asset subsidies and their progressivity conrms the
results of our optimality tests. In other words, asset subsidies are an important part of our Pareto
optimal reform.
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Table 4: Sources of Retirement Income
Share of public transfers in retirement income (%)
Optimal Reform
Income Quartiles Dataa Status quo (incl.asset subsidies) (excl.asset subsidies)
1st 95 100 81 52
2nd 90 97 71 31
3rd 67 88 64 20
4th 34 50 50 8
aSource: Table 6 in Poterba (2014).
6.3 Sources of Retirement Income
It is useful to compare the sources of retirement income in the status quo economy and that of
the optimal reform. This would shed light on the burden of the reform for the government and
on changes in individual budgets.
Table 4 compares the share of government transfers out of the total income for retired indi-
viduals (asset income plus government transfers). In our calculation for the status quo economy,
the government transfers consist of social security (and Medicare) benets. For comparison, we
also include the share of government transfers in retirement income as measured in CPS data
(reported in Poterba (2014)).32
The numbers in our status quo economy are close to the CPS data, particularly for the lower
half of the income distribution. For the upper half, the discrepancy mainly stems from our as-
sumption that retirement age is the same across all individuals, but in reality some individuals
age 65 or older still work and do not collect social security benets.
An important feature of the reform economy is the signicant reduction in share of govern-
ment transfers in retirement income for all income groups except the top quartile. This is mainly
a result of the presence of asset subsidies. In particular, asset subsidies imply that individuals
will save more. As a result, asset income constitutes a higher fraction of retirement income and
therefore the share of government transfers in income declines.
6.4 Distributional and Budgetary Eects of the Reform
While our exercise keeps the distribution of welfare the same, an optimal reform can aect the
allocation of resources across individuals. In this section, we describe the eect of our optimal
reform exercise on the distribution of allocations.
32To make the CPS statistics comparable to our model, we exclude labor earnings (we calculate the share govern-
ment transfers out of all incomes excluding labor earnings).
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Figure 7: Distribution of earnings and wealth: status quo vs. optimal reform. The black line
shows the results in the calibrated economy with current U.S. status quo policies. The blue line
shows the results under Pareto optimal policies (for current U.S. demographic parameters and
holding factor prices xed).
Figure 7 shows the Lorenz curve for earnings and wealth distribution for status quo and ef-
cient allocations. As we see, the optimal reform policies do not have a signicant eect on
the distribution of earnings, which is in line with the fact that earnings taxes exhibit very little
change. On the other hand, the ecient distribution of assets is less concentrated than in the sta-
tus quo. In particular, the wealth Gini under reform policies is 0.64, which is signicantly lower
than the wealth Gini of 0.78 under the status quo. This is mainly because the consumption of
low-productivity individuals increases late in life, due to subsidies on assets and, as a result, the
asset distribution becomes less skewed.
Table 5 shows how the optimal reform aects government’s tax revenue and transfers. There
is little dierence in total tax revenue and total transfers as a fraction of the GDP. However, the
nature of transfers changes signicantly in an optimal reform. Pure transfers before and after
retirement fall as a percentage of the GDP and instead asset subsidies which amount to 7 percent
of the GDP are introduced. Optimal reform policies can achieve the same welfare as status quo
policies by collecting more taxes and transferring less resources. This is possible because optimal
reform policies remove ineciencies due to a lack of annuitization and ineciencies in the status
quo income tax.
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Table 5: Aggregate eects of reform – current U.S. demographics
Current U.S. Optimal Reform
Fixed Prices EndogenousPrices
Factor prices
Interest rate (%) 4 4 3.7
Wage 1 1 1.02
Values relative to GDP
Consumption 0.70 0.67 0.69
Capital 3.00 3.43 3.13
Tax revenue (total) 0.25 0.26 0.26
Earnings tax 0.15 0.15 0.16
Consumption tax 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital (corporate) tax 0.06 0.07 0.06
Transfers 0.14 0.13 0.10
To retirees 0.09 0.03 0.02
To workers 0.05 0.03 0.03
Asset subsidies 0.00 0.07 0.05
Changes relative to the status quo (%)
GDP – 7.15 2.17
Consumption – 2.59 0.81
Capital – 22.34 6.69
Labor input – -1.39 -0.29
PDV of net resources – -5.15 -15.36
6.5 Aggregate Eects of Reforms
Table 5 shows the summary statistics of aggregate variables for our economy. In the rst column,
we report the aggregate quantities in the calibrated benchmark with the status quo U.S. policies.
The second column shows the aggregate variables under Pareto optimal reform policies, holding
factor prices xed. In this case, the stock of capital in the economy is 22 percent higher relative to
the status quo. This is due to higher incentives to save provided by optimal asset subsidies. As a
result, the GDP is higher by 7 percent and consumption by 2.6 percent relative to the status quo.
However, consumption as share of the GDP falls slightly from 0.7 to 0.67. This is, again, due to a
higher desire for savings under optimal reform policies. Overall, the present discounted value of
consumption, net of labor income, for each generation falls by 5.15 percent in the optimal reform
relative to the status quo.
The third column in Table 5 shows aggregate quantities under Pareto optimal policies with
endogenous factor prices. In this case, the capital stock is higher by only 6.7 percent. This is due
to the general equilibrium eect of the lower real return (3.7 percent relative to 4 percent). The
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GDP is higher by 2.2 percent and consumption by 0.8 percent relative to the status quo. The cost
savings in this case are three times larger relative to the case with xed factor prices. In other
words, the present discounted value of consumption, net of labor income, for each a generation
falls by 15.35 percent. This can be accounted for entirely by the fall in the interest rate.33
6.6 The Importance of Asset Subsidies
As shown above, asset subsidies play an important role in our Pareto optimal reforms. In par-
ticular, based on the optimality tests and the optimal reform exercise, a reform of the earnings
taxes does not seem to play an important role. One might, however, think that this is due to
the generality and exibility of the asset taxes. Here, we briey describe an exercise that further
highlights the role of asset taxes and the insignicance of earnings taxes. We leave the details of
the analysis to the appendix.
Our restricted reform is similar to privatization. More precisely, we present the best reform
policies that remove old-age transfers but do not include any asset taxes or subsidies. In this
regard, the eciency gains from these policies can be viewed as an upper bound on privatization
policies. Our exercise shows that the best privatization policy involves a decline in the earnings
tax rate by around 3 percent. Furthermore, our calculations show that the cost of this reform,
measured as the present value of consumption net of labor income, increases by 2.25 percent
under xed prices, compared to a decline of 5.15 percent in our optimal reform.34 This result is
mainly due to the absence of annuities. Without annuities and asset subsidies, the consumption
of individuals declines as they age. This observation, combined with the fact that in the status
quo economy, social security transfers partially substitute for annuities, implies that privatization
cannot decrease the cost of delivering the status quo level of welfare.
Finally, in the appendix, we perform various robustness exercises on parameter values in
order to test the robustness of our results. In all of the calculations, asset subsidies prove to be
an integral part of the reforms, while earnings taxes are of less importance.35
33As we show in section 7, when general equilibrium analysis includes demographic changes, factor prices are
not very dierent between the status quo and reform economies. Hence, the general equilibrium eects are smaller
in the presence of a demographic change.
34This is in stark contrast to McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming), who nd a Pareto improving policy reform.
Their nding relies on the choice of the elasticity of the labor supply. As we show in the appendix, when the
elasticity of the labor supply is high, it is possible to reduce the resource cost through privatization and hence a
Pareto improving privatization policy exists.
35In the appendix, we also describe an exercise that imposes linearity on asset subsidies. This constraint signi-
cantly lowers the gains of the reform.
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7 Quantitative Results: Transition
The above analysis points toward the key policies that are relevant for an overhaul of the scal
policies including social security in the steady state. While the results are informative, the anal-
ysis assumes that there is no demographic change and therefore downplays the role of a policy
reform. In this section, we repeat our quantitative exercise in an aging society with a declining
population growth and mortality rate. Our quantitative results conrm the importance of asset
tax reforms and the lack of importance of earnings tax reforms.
AnAging Economy. We assume that the status quo economy is initially in a steady state de-
termined by the calibrated parameters, as described in Section 5. The economy then experiences
a demographic transition which starts at t = 0 and ends in 50 years. At the conclusion of the
demographic transition, the population growth is 0.5 percent (down from 1 percent), consistent
with U.S. Census Bureau’s projections (see Colby and Ortman (2015)). In addition, the new pop-
ulation mortality rates match the mortality rates of 2040 birth cohort males (Table 7 in Bell and
Miller (2005)). We calibrate equation (24) to match the dierences in mortality rates among life-
time earning deciles reported in Waldron (2013), as well as the new population mortality rates.36
All parameters change gradually according to a linear trend over the 50-year transition period.
These assumptions imply that the ratio of workers to retirees falls from 4 (its current value) to
2.4 (its projected value). This is consistent with U.S. Census Bureau’s projections (see Colby and
Ortman (2015)).
Transition in the Status Quo Economy. In order to solve for optimal policies, we need to
know the distribution of lifetime welfare for each birth cohort along the transition path for the
status quo economy. For the status quo, we assume the income tax schedules and social security
benet formula do not change. Moreover, the debt to GDP ratio is held constant at its initial
calibrated value of 50 percent. Therefore, in order to satisfy government budget constraint, we
adjust the transfers to workers. It is important to note that, due to political uncertainties, it is
impossible to know how status quo policies evolve in response to demographic changes. Here, we
use the simplest benchmark to conduct our analysis. However, our methodology can be applied
to any alternative assumption for the future path of status quo policies.
The second column in Table 6 shows how the demographic change and continuation of status
quo policies aect the aggregates. Since mortality is lower, individuals live longer and therefore
have a higher demand for saving. This in turn increases the stock of capital by 3.4 percent.
However, due to the lower number of workers as share of population, the labor input falls by 7.7
percent, resulting in a 3.9 percent decline in the GDP.
While continuation of the status quo policies does not change the tax revenue as percentage
36We assume that the ratio of mortality among lifetime earning deciles does not change.
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Figure 8: Distribution of earnings and wealth: status quo vs. optimal reform. The black solid
line shows the results in the calibrated economy with current U.S. status quo policies. The black
dashed line shows the steady state results with projected demographic parameters and contin-
uation of status quo policies. The blue line shows the steady state results under Pareto optimal
policies for projected demographic parameters. Factor prices are endogenous.
of the GDP, there is a signicant increase in old-age transfers as percentage of the GDP. This is
due to the fact that there are more retirees in the economy. On the other hand, to oset the eect
of a rise in old-age transfers on government budget, the transfer to workers drops to 1 percent
of the GDP (from the initial 5 percent). This decline in transfers contributes to an increase in
inequality in the economy. To be able to quantify the changes in inequality, we report the “90 to
10 consumption equivalence”. This is the percentage of the lifetime consumption that a person
in the 90th percentile of the ability distribution is willing to give up, in order to be indierent
between his own consumption allocation and that of a person in the 10th percentile of the ability
distribution. As we see in the rst and second column, the inequality increases according to this
measure. We also report a cross-sectional distribution of earnings and wealth for the new steady
state in Figure 8. There is no change in the distribution of earnings. However, the distribution of
wealth becomes more unequal (the wealth Gini index rises from 0.78 to 0.8).
Reform Exercise. Using the time path of the distribution of welfare for each generation, we
solve the problem of minimizing the resource cost of delivering the status quo welfare to each
individual in each birth cohort. There are two main subtleties that we need to take a stand on in
this exercise: First, we need to take a stand on what can be done with the initial generations (i.e.,
the generations that are alive at the time of reform). Second, we need to take a stand on how the
gains from the reform are distributed.
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Figure 9: Evolution of optimal marginal labor income tax functions over the transition.
On the rst issue, the complication arises from an information problem. At the time of the
reform, households who have worked and saved previously have revealed their types. Thus if the
government has a exible enough tax function (e.g., generation-specic taxes on their assets at
the time of the reform), it can achieve rst best and fully bypass the incentive problem. We think
this ability of the government to completely bypass the incentive problem is unrealistic. It also
creates a discontinuity on allocations for people who are alive at the time of the reform relative
to future generations, which makes it harder to accept it as a reasonable reform. We sidestep this
issue by assuming that the initial generations face the same policies as the status quo economy.
In other words, the policy reform only applies to those who are born after the start of the reform.
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Figure 10: Evolution of optimal marginal asset tax functions over the transition.
On the second issue, there are many ways to distribute the welfare gains from switching to
optimal reforms. Given the above discussion, we choose one where everything is given to the
initial generations (i.e., those alive at the time of implementing the reform). While this is one of
many ways to do the reform, we think it is perhaps more politically viable than others, since all
of the gains are given to the initial generations, who will be voting for such a reform.
To summarize, any person who is alive at the beginning of the reform (t = 0) will face the sta-
tus quo policies and will receive an additional one-time lump-sum transfer. All other individuals
will face optimal reform policies.
Optimal Reforms. Our quantitative exercise for the transition mainly conrms our previous
40
0 50 100 150 200
2.8
3
3.2
3.4
Capital to Output Ratio
Continue Status-quo
Optimal Reform
0 50 100 150 200
0.68
0.7
0.72
Consumption (share of GDP)
0 50 100 150 200
-10
-5
0
5
10
%
Primary Surplus (% of GDP)
0 50 100 150 200
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
Aggregate Hours per Capita
0 50 100 150 200
Years
3.2
3.4
3.6
3.8
4
4.2
%
Interest Rate
0 50 100 150 200
Years
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
1.06
Wages
Figure 11: Evolution of aggregates along the transition.
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Table 6: Aggregate eects of demographic transition and policy change
Current
Demographics Future Demographics
Status quo ContinueStatus quo
Optimal
Reform
Factor prices
Interest rate (%) 4 3.4 3.3
Wage 1 1.04 1.05
90-10 consumption equivalence (%) 3.27 3.70 3.70
Values relative to GDP
Consumption 0.70 0.70 0.70
Capital 3.00 3.23 3.28
Tax revenue (total) 0.25 0.25 0.24
Earnings tax 0.15 0.16 0.15
Consumption tax 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital (corporate) tax 0.06 0.05 0.05
Transfers 0.14 0.15 0.08
To retirees 0.09 0.14 0.03
To workers 0.05 0.01 -0.01
Asset subsidies 0.00 0.00 0.06
Change relative to current U.S. (%)
GDP – -3.9 -2.7
Consumption – -3.8 -3.1
Capital – 3.4 6.5
Labor input – -7.7 -7.5
ndings in our steady state analysis: asset subsidies play a key role in the reform, while earnings
taxes do not change it by much. Figure 9 shows the changes in the earnings taxes. Marginal
earnings taxes decline slightly, since inequality is growing over time. Note that in our approach,
an increase in inequality in the status quo economy increases the lifetime utility that must be
delivered to the most productive individuals. This in turn makes the promise-keeping constraint
(inequality (13)) on these individuals tighter, thereby increasing their implicit welfare weights.
Higher welfare weight on these individuals implies lower distortion. As a result, they face lower
marginal taxes. This decline, however, is not large (around 3–5 percent). Furthermore, asset
subsidies are still signicant although slightly lower, due to the decline in the mortality rate
(Figure 10).
The last column of Table 6 shows the impact of these policies on aggregate allocations and
on government budget. Capital stock rises more relative to the status quo economy. This leads
to a smaller decline in the GDP and aggregate consumption. 37 Figure 11 shows the path of the
37The decline is primarily driven by a fall in the labor supply, triggered by a decline in the number of workers.
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aggregate variables over the transition. The jump in the primary surplus as share of GDP is due
to the initial lump-sum distribution.
Importantly, reform policies reduce the cost of delivering the status quo welfare to each birth
cohort. Under optimal reform policies, the present discounted value of consumption net of labor
income for a newborn is 4.9 percent lower relative to the status quo in the steady state. As we
discuss above, we distribute these resources to those who are alive at the start of the reform in a
lump-sum fashion. This transfer is equivalent to 9 percent of the GDP in the initial steady state.
Overall, we view the results of our quantitative exercises, one for the aging economy and one
in the steady state, as pointing toward the importance of asset subsidies to all individuals as an
integral part of any scal policy reform. This is in contrast with much of the discussion in the
policy circles on earnings tax reform (reform of the payroll taxes, etc.).
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have provided a theoretical and quantitative analysis of Pareto optimal policy
reforms aimed at nancing retirement, i.e., reforms that intend to separate the eciency of such
schemes from their distributional consequences. Our optimal reform approach points toward the
importance of subsidization of asset holdings late in life. At the same time, our analysis shows
that reforms aimed at earnings taxes (such as a decline in payroll taxes or an extension of social
security maximum earnings cap) are not integral to Pareto optimal reforms.
To keep our analysis tractable, we have focused on permanent ability types and abstracted
from idiosyncratic shocks that are the focus of most of the optimal dynamic tax literature. Inclu-
sion of these shocks introduces additional reasons for taxing capital (as in Golosov et al. (2003)
and Golosov et al. (forthcoming)) in the pre-retirement period. As shown by others, such shocks
induce very little reason to tax capital income (see Farhi and Werning (2012)), compared to the
magnitude of our savings distortions. Hence, we have good reasons to believe that including
shocks to earnings does not alter our results.
A key feature of our model is the correlation between earning ability and mortality. In choos-
ing this assumption, we are guided by the large body of evidence that points to a strong correla-
tion between socioeconomic factors (such as income or education) and mortality rates. We take
an extreme view and assume that this correlation is exogenously given and individuals’ choice
has no eect on their mortality. In reality, many individuals aect their mortality through the
decisions they make over their lifetime. We choose to ignore these eects due to two reasons.
First, as Ales et al. (2014) show, when individuals dier in their earning ability, and mortality is
endogenous, eciency implies more investment in the survival of the higher-ability individuals.
Hence, it is never ecient to eliminate the correlation between ability and mortality. Second, in
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any model in which the length of life is endogenous, the level of utility ow becomes important
in marginal decisions by individuals. This makes analysis of such models very complicated and
intractable. It is important, however, to know how inclusion of endogenous mortality aects our
analysis of optimal policy. We leave this for future research.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
We rst show the following lemma:
Lemma 3. A feasible allocation {c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) , yt (θ)}θ∈Θ,t≥0 together with capital allocationKt
is induced by some sequence of tax functions Ty,t (·) , Ta,t (·, ·) if and only if
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ
U
c1,t (θˆ) , c2,t (θˆ) , y
(
θˆ
)
θ
 (25)
Proof. Suppose that an allocation is induced by a sequence of tax functions and suppose that for
some types θ and θ′
U
(
c1,t (θ
′) , c2,t (θ′) ,
y (θ′)
θ
)
> U
(
c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) ,
y (θ)
θ
)
Then facing the tax functions, an agent of type θ at t can choose c1,t (θ′) , yt (θ′) , c2,t (θ′) - this
is a feasible choice since budget constraints are independent of agent’s types. This implies that
the original allocations cannot be induced by the tax functions as the allocations are not optimal
under the tax codes.
48
Now consider a feasible allocation that satises the condition in the statement of Lemma. Let
at (θ) be dened by
at (θ) =
wtyt (θ)− c1,t (θ)
qt
where wt = FL
(
Kt, Nt
∫
yt (θ) dH
)
. Then let Tˆa,t+1 be dened by
Tˆa,t+1 (wtyt (θ) , (1 + rt+1) at+1 (θ)) = c2,t (θ)− (1 + rt+1) at+1 (θ)
where rt = FK
(
Kt, Nt
∫
ytdH (θ)
)
. Note that this tax function is well-dened as if yt (θ) and
at+1 (θ) are the same for two types, then the incentive compatibility constraint implies that
c2,t (θ) must also be the same and therefore so is the value of Tˆa. Furthermore, for an value
(wty, (1 + rt+1) a) with (y, a) 6= (yt (θ) , at+1 (θ)), we choose a value for Tˆa,t+1 so that these
points are not chosen by any type θ - this is easily done by considering the value for the highest
type that benets from such a point and choosing it high enough so that such type does not want
to choose this point. If under this construction, qt
∫
at+1dH 6= Kt+1, then we can adjust the tax
function by a constant in order to make this equality be satised.
By the incentive compatibility and the construction of Tˆa,t+1 and Tˆy := 0, it is optimal for an
individual of type θ to choose the desired allocation. Since this allocation is feasible, it must be
induced by the constructed tax functions.
Now we prove Proposition 1
Proof. Given the above Lemma, we can focus on allocations. In particular, among the set of feasi-
ble and incentive compatible allocations (those satisfying (25)), those induced by Pareto optimal
tax functions must be Pareto optimal themselves. In what follows, we characterize the set of
Pareto optimal allocation. A useful property that helps us in our analysis is that under our as-
sumption of the utility function, the set of incentive compatible allocations is convex, in the utility
space. This property allows to use standard separating hyperplane arguments to show that an
allocation is Pareto optimal if and only if a positive continuous function α (t, θ) exists so that this
allocation is the solution to the following planning problem
max
∞∑
t=0
∫
α (t, θ)U
(
c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) ,
yt (θ)
θ
)
dH (θ)
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subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
U
c1,t (θˆ) , c2,t (θˆ) , yt
(
θˆ
)
θ

Kt + F
(
Kt, Nt
∫
ytdH
)
≥Nt
∫
c1,tdH +Nt−1
∫
c2,t−1dH +Kt+1
Since if we rewrite the constraint set in terms of utilities, it is a convex set, we can write the above
in its dual form
max
∞∑
t=0
λt
[
F
(
Kt, Nt
∫
ytdH
)
+Kt −Kt+1 −Nt
∫
c1,tdH −Nt−1
∫
c2,t−1dH
]
(P1)
subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
U
c1,t (θˆ) , c2,t (θˆ) , yt
(
θˆ
)
θ

U
(
c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) ,
yt (θ)
θ
)
≥ Wt (θ)
where Wt (θ) is the utility of each individual at date t under the specied allocation. Note that
since the objective is strictly concave - if we rewrite things in terms of utilities - and the constraint
set is convex, the solution to this planning problem is unique.
Now consider the solution to the above problem for a sequence of λt’s . Then the First Order
Conditions with respect to Kt satisfy
λtFK,t + λt = λt−1
Now, if we let
wt = FL
(
Kt, Nt
∫
ytdH
)
,
then the solution to the above optimization problem is also a solution to
max
∞∑
t=0
λt
[
wtNt
∫
ytdH −Nt
∫
c1,tdH −Nt−1
∫
c2,t−1dH
]
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subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
U
c1,t (θˆ) , c2,t (θˆ) , yt
(
θˆ
)
θ

U
(
c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) ,
yt (θ)
θ
)
≥ Wt (θ)
given {wt}t≥0. We can rewrite the above optimization as
max
∞∑
t=0
λtNt
[
wt
∫
ytdH −
∫
c1,tdH − λt+1
λt
∫
c2,tdH
]
subject to
θ ∈ arg max
θˆ∈Θ
U
c1,t (θˆ) , c2,t (θˆ) , yt
(
θˆ
)
θ

U
(
c1,t (θ) , c2,t (θ) ,
yt (θ)
θ
)
≥ Wt (θ)
If we dene 1 + rt+1 = λt/λt+1, then since each generation’s contribution to the objective is
additively separable, the solution to the above must also solve the optimization (P). Now, if an
allocation solves optimization (P), then it must be the solution of the above problem where λt =∏t
s=0 (1 + FK,s)
−1. By assumption γ < FK,t − n as a result, Ntλt → 0 and the objective in
the above is well-dened. Now since given these values of λt, the solution to the above satises
the FOC’s associated with (P1) and the solution to (P1) is unique, the allocation must be Pareto
optimal. This concludes the proof.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. For the class of preferences considered, any Pareto optimal allocation induced by some tax
function must solve planning problem (P). If we replace incentive compatibility constraint with
its associated rst order condition
U ′ (θ) =
(
β′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′ (θ)
P (θ)
)
β (θ)P (θ)u (c1 (θ)) +
y (θ)
θ2
v′
(
y (θ)
θ
)
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where U (θ) is the utility of individual θ. The rst order conditions associated with this problem
are given by
−1 + ηu′ (c1,t) = 0
wt − η1
θ
v′ − µ 1
θ2
(
v′ +
yt
θ
v′′
)
= 0
− P
1 + rt+1
+ ηβPu′ (c2,t)− µ
(
β′
β
+
P ′
P
)
βPu′ (c2,t) = 0
−η − 1
h
(µh)′ + γ = 0
µ
(
θ
)
h
(
θ
)
+ γ
(
θ
)
= 0
µ
(
θ
)
h
(
θ
)− γ (θ) = 0
Pareto optimality of the allocation implies that γ ≥ 0 for all values of θ. By denition of the labor
and saving wedges, we have
1− τl,t = v
′ (yt/θ)
wtu′ (c1,t) θ
1− τa,t = qtu
′ (c1,t)
βP (1 + rt+1)u′ (c2,t)
The above implies that
µ =
wt − η 1θv′
1
θ2
(
v′ + y
θ
v′′
) = θ2wt − 1u′(c1) 1θv′
v′
(
1 + 1
ε
)
= wtθ
2 τl,t
v′
ε
1 + ε
= θ
τl,t
1− τl,t
ε
1 + ε
1
u′ (c1,t)
When γ ≥ 0, we must have that
η ≥ −1
h
(µh)′
1
u′ (c1)
≥ −1
h
(µh)′ = µ
(
h′
h
+
µ′
µ
)
1
u′ (c1,t)
≥ −θ τl,t
1− τl,t
ε
1 + ε
1
u′ (c1,t)
[
h′
h
+
1
θ
+
τ ′l,t
τl,t (1− τl,t) +
−u′′ (c1,t) c1,t
u′ (c1,t)
c′1,t
c1,t
]
1 ≥ −θ τl,t
1− τl,t
ε
1 + ε
[
h′
h
+
1
θ
+
τ ′l,t
(1− τl,t) τl,t +
−u′′ (c1,t) c1,t
u′ (c1,t)
c′1,t
c1,t
]
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which is the inequality stated in the proposition.
Note that the FOC’s also imply that
− u
′ (c1,t)
(1 + rt+1) βu′ (c2,t)
+ 1 = u′ (c1,t)µ
(
β′
β
+
P ′
P
)
−P
qt
(1− τa,t) + 1 = θ τl,t
1− τl,t
ε
1 + ε
(
β′
β
+
P ′
P
)
τa,t = 1− qt
P
+
qt
P
θ
τl,t
1− τl,t
ε
1 + ε
(
β′
β
+
P ′
P
)
which completes the proof.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. Consider the individual maximization problem for type θ where hours lj are replaced by
yj = ϕj (θ) lj :
U (θ) = max
cj ,yj ,aj+1
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
(
u (cj (θ))− v
(
yj (θ)
ϕj (θ)
))
subject to (4).Note that θ does not appear in the budget constraint.
Now take envelope condition with respect to θ
U ′ (θ) =
J∑
j=0
(
jβ′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
)
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
[
u (cj)− v
(
yj
ϕj (θ)
)]
+
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
[
ϕ′j (θ) yj
ϕj (θ)
2 v
′
(
yj
ϕj (θ)
)]
.
Now replace lj back and evaluate at the solution {cj (θ) , lj (θ)}
U ′ (θ) =
J∑
j=0
β (θ)j Pj (θ)
[
ϕ′j (θ) lj (θ)
ϕj (θ)
v′ (lj (θ))
]
+
J∑
j=0
(
jβ′ (θ)
β (θ)
+
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
)
β (θ)j Pj (θ) [u (cj (θ))− v (lj (θ))] .
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A.4 Proof of Lemma 2
Proof. Let dH (θ) = h (θ) dθ where h (θ) is the density function. Let η (θ)h (θ), µ (θ)h (θ) and
γ (θ)h (θ) be multipliers on equations (11), (12) and (13) respectively. The rst order conditions
for this problem are (
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
+ j
β
′
(θ)
β (θ)
))
u′ (cj (θ)) =
1
βj (1 + r)j
(26)(
η (θ)− µ (θ) ϕ
′
j (θ)
ϕj (θ)
(
1 + lj (θ)
v′′ (lj (θ))
v′ (lj (θ))
)
+ µ (θ)
(
P ′j (θ)
Pj (θ)
+ j
β
′
(θ)
β (θ)
))
v′ (lj (θ)) =
ϕj (θ)
βj (1 + r)j
(27)
η (θ)− µ (θ) h
′ (θ)
h (θ)
− γ (θ) = µ′ (θ) , (28)
and the boundary conditions
µ (θ) = µ
(
θ¯
)
= 0.
Combine Equations (26) and (27) and let εF,j (θ) = v
′(lj(θ))
v′′(lj(θ))lj(θ)
.
v′ (lj (θ))
ϕj (θ)u′ (cj (θ))
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′
(θ)
β(θ)
)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
)
− µ (θ) ϕ′j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
(
1 + lj (θ)
v′′(lj(θ))
v′(lj(θ))
)
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′
(θ)
β(θ)
)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
)
− µ (θ) ϕ′j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
(1 + 1/εF,j (θ))
.
Therefore,
τlabor,j (θ) = 1−
v′ (lj (θ))
ϕj (θ)u′ (cj (θ))
=
−µ (θ) ϕ′j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
(1 + 1/εF,j (θ))
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
)
− µ (θ) ϕ′j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
(1 + 1/εF,j (θ))
and
τlabor,j (θ)
1− τlabor,j (θ)
=
−µ(θ)
η(θ)
ϕ′j(θ)
ϕj(θ)
(1 + 1/εF,j (θ))
1 + µ(θ)
η(θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
) (29)
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Now, note that from Equation (26), η (θ) = 1
u′(c0(θ))
. Form (28) we can solve for µ (θ)
µ (θ) = − 1
h (θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
(
η
(
θ˜
)
− γ
(
θ˜
))
dH
(
θ˜
)
= − 1
h (θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
1
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜)u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dH (θ˜)
= −1−H (θ)
h (θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
1
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜)u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dH
(
θ˜
)
1−H (θ)
= −η (θ) 1−H (θ)
h (θ)
∫ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0 (θ))
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜)u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dH
(
θ˜
)
1−H (θ) .
Therefore,
−µ (θ)
η (θ)
=
(
1−H (θ)
h (θ)
)
g (θ) ,
where
g (θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
u′ (c0 (θ))
u′
(
c0
(
θ˜
)) (1− γ (θ˜)u′ (c0 (θ˜))) dH
(
θ˜
)
1−H (θ) .
By replacing these back into (29) we get Equation (17).
A.5 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. From Equation (26)
u′ (cj (θ))
β(1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
=
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′
(θ)
β(θ)
)
η (θ) + µ (θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′
(θ)
β(θ)
)
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Therefore,
τannuity,j (θ) = 1−
u′ (cj (θ))
β(1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
=
µ(θ)
η(θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
− P ′j+1(θ)
Pj+1(θ)
+ β
′
(θ)
β(θ)
)
1 + µ(θ)
η(θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
)
=
−µ(θ)
η(θ)
p′j+1(θ)
pj+1(θ)
1 + µ(θ)
η(θ)
(
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
+ j β
′ (θ)
β(θ)
)
=
p′j+1 (θ)
pj+1 (θ)
(
1−H (θ)
h (θ)
)
g (θ)
1−
(
1−H(θ)
h(θ)
)
g (θ)
P ′j(θ)
Pj(θ)
.
The second equality is true because P
′
j(θ)
Pj(θ)
− P ′j+1(θ)
Pj+1(θ)
=
p′j+1(θ)
pj+1(θ)
.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 4
To avoid clutter, assume uc,j (θ) ≡ u′ (cj (θ)) and vl,j (θ) ≡ v′ (lj (θ)). Also we will drop depen-
dence on θ whenever possible.
Proof. Consider rst order conditions (26), (27) and (28). Also, recall that
1− τl,j = vl,j
ϕjuc,j
pj+1 (1− τa,j+1) = uc,j
β(1 + r)uc,j+1
Evaluate these equations at j = 0, we get
1
uc,0
= η
ϕ
v′l,0
= η − µϕ0,θ
ϕ0
(
1 +
1
ε
)
τl,0
1− τl,0
1
uc,0
= −µϕ0,θ
ϕ0
(
1 +
1
ε
)
µ = − τl,0
1− τl,0
1
uc,0
ϕ0
ϕ0,θ
ε
1 + ε
.
Also
η − µh
′
h
− γ = µ′.
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As in Proposition 2, the allocation is Pareto optimal if γ ≥ 0
η − µh
′
h
≤ µ′.
Replacing all the terms gives the inequality at j = 0
1 ≥ − τl,0
1− τl,0
ϕ0
ϕ0,θ
ε
1 + ε
(
h′
h
+
τ ′l,0
(1− τl,0) τl,0 +
ϕ0,θ
ϕ0
− ϕ0,θθ
ϕ0,θ
+ σ
c′0
c0
)
, (30)
where σ = −ucc,0c0
uc,0
.
Note, also that combining (26) and (27) we get
− (β(1 + r))j µϕj,θ
ϕj
(
1 +
1
ε
)
=
ϕj
vl.j
− 1
uc,j
=
τl,j
1− τl,j
1
uc,j
.
Therefore
τl,j+1
1− τl,j+1 =
τl,j
1− τl,j
β(1 + r)uc,j+1
uc,j
ϕj+1,θ/ϕj+1
ϕj,θ/ϕj
. (31)
Replace for
pj+1 (1− τa,j+1) = uc,j
β(1 + r)uc,j+1
,
we get
τl,j+1
1− τl,j+1 =
τl,j
1− τl,j
1
pj+1 (1− τa,j+1)
ϕj+1,θ/ϕj+1
ϕj,θ/ϕj
. (32)
Note also that
pj+1 (1− τa,j+1) = uc,j
β(1 + r)uc,j+1
= (βR)
η + µ
(
P˙j+1
Pj+1
+ (j + 1) β˙
β
)
η + µ
(
P˙j
Pj
+ j β˙
β
)
=
1−τl,0
τl,0
ϕ0,θ
ϕ0
1+ε
ε
−
(
P˙j+1
Pj+1
+ (j + 1) β˙
β
)
1−τl,0
τl,0
ϕ0,θ
ϕ0
1+ε
ε
−
(
P˙j
Pj
+ j β˙
β
) (33)
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Use this to replace (1− τa,j+1) in equation (32) and combine the result with (30) we get
1 ≥ −
τl,j
1−τl,j
ϕj
ϕj,θ
ε
1+ε
1 +
(
τl,j
1−τl,j
ϕj
ϕj,θ
ε
1+ε
)(
P˙j
Pj
+ j β˙
β
) (h′
h
+
τ ′l,0
(1− τl,0) τl,0 +
ϕ0,θ
ϕ0
− ϕ0,θθ
ϕ0,θ
+ σ
c′0
c0
)
,
which is the inequality (22). Also, the equation (23) is given by (33).
B Construction of Tax Schedules
In this section, we describe how to back out the optimal taxes from the optimal allocations and
wedges discussed above.
The following lemma and its proof illustrate the construction of a tax and transfer schedule
as in (4) such that individual optimizations’ rst order conditions are satised: (in what follows
we adopt the following notation to avoid clutter; uc,j (θ) ≡ u′ (cj (θ)) and vl,j (θ) ≡ v′ (lj (θ)).)
Lemma 4. Consider an allocation {cj (θ) , lj (θ)} that satises implementability constraint (9). Sup-
pose that (ϕj (θ) lj (θ))
′ > 0 and
J∑
s=j
β (θ)s Ps (θ)
[
uc,s (θ) c
′
s (θ)− vl,s (θ) (ϕs (θ) ls (θ))′
]
> 0.
Then tax and transfer functions Ta,j (·) , Ty,j (·) , Sj together with asset holdings aj (θ) exists so that
the allocations {cj (θ) , lj (θ) , aj (θ)} satisfy the budget constraints (4) and the rst order conditions
associated with the individual optimization.
Proof. We start by writing the rst order conditions for the the maximization problem above for
an individual of type θ
1− T ′y,j (ϕj (θ) lj (θ)) =
v′ (lj (θ))
ϕj (θ)uc,j (θ)
, (34)
ucj = β (1 + r) pj+1 (θ)
(
1− T ′a,j+1
)
ucj+1 (35)
Equation (34) is the individual intra-temporal optimality condition and equation (35) is the indi-
vidual Euler equation. We know from discussion in Section 4.2 that this Euler equation must be
distorted at the ecient allocation. Therefore, optimal marginal taxes T ′a,j+1 are dierent from
zero.
We can use equation (34) to back out the optimal marginal taxes on labor earning at each age.
This is possible because the ecient allocations of consumption and hours come directly from
solving the planning problem. Thus, the earnings taxes can simply be dened by integrating over
the implied marginal rate in (34) - this is well-dened since output in each age is increasing in θ.
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The calculation of optimal asset taxes, however, is not straight-forward. The level of assets
a cannot be pinned down independent from the marginal taxes T ′a,j+1. Therefore, we are going
to assume that asset holdings of the lowest type is zero for all ages. This implies that in the
equilibrium that decentralizes ecient allocations, the poorest individual is hand-to-mouth in all
ages. Given this restriction we can use the following procedure to nd the optimal asset taxes.
We can combine the equations (34) and (35) together with (4) and use extensive algebra to
show that the derivative of asset holdings with respect to θ, a′j , satises
a′j (θ) =
1
uc,j (θ)
T∑
s=j
βs−j
Ps (θ)
Pj (θ)
[
uc,s (θ) c
′
s (θ) +−vl,s (θ) (ϕs (θ) ls (θ))′
]
.
Since by assumption aj (θ) = 0, the above determines the level of asset holdings at each age and
for each type
aj (θ) = aj (θ) +
∫ θ
θ
a′j (θ) dθ.
Finally, using the Euler equation (35), we must have
1− T ′a,j+1 =
ucj
β (1 + r) pj+1ucj+1
.
The above formula determines the marginal tax rate on asset holdings and since a′j > 0, a well-
dened tax function on asset holdings must exist. This completes the construction.
The construction of the taxes and asset holdings are somewhat standard. In particular, earn-
ings and asset taxes can be constructed from integrating the labor and saving wedges as dened
above. Furthermore, xing the intercept of taxes at each age, determines the asset holdings of
individuals. Finally, the assumptions imposed on allocations in the lemma ensure that assets and
earnings at each age are increasing in θ and thus the tax functions constructed are well-dened.
We cannot derive a closed form formula for optimal taxes. However, our implementation pro-
cedure as discussed in the above paragraph provides a guideline on how to numerically compute
the optimal tax functions. We present the results of these computations in Section 6.2.
Finally, note that the monotonicity constraints in Lemma 4 are necessary for existence of a tax
function. While we have no way of theoretically checking that they are satised, our numerical
simulations always involve a check that ensures that they are indeed satised. Needless to say,
in all of our simulations the monotonicity constraints are satised.
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C Alternative Policy Reforms
In this section, we repeat our Pareto optimal reform exercise for a restricted set of policies. We
rst solve for optimal policies that do not include any old age transfers or any asset subsidies.
This can be thought of as the best possible outcome that can be achieved through phasing out
of social security and medicare. The goal of this exercise is to examine the importance of asset
subsidies.
In the second exercise we solve for optimal polices that are restricted to only linear asset sub-
sidies. The gaol of this exercise is to examine the importance of progressivity in asset subsidies.
Similar to our main exercise, both of these alternative policy reforms are implemented in an
economy with current U.S. demographics and xed factor prices (at the calibrated status quo
values).
C.1 Privatization: no old age transfers and no asset subsidies
One particular proposal that has received considerable attention in the literature is privatization of
social security. More precisely, this is the proposal to eliminate social security retirement benets
and reduce payroll taxes and move towards a save-for-retirement system.38 These privatization
polices dier from our optimal reform policy in two very important ways. First, our optimal
reform policies do not involve a major adjustment in labor income taxes. Second, our optimal
reform policies rely crucially on asset subsidies.
In this section we examine the importance of the asset subsidies. More precisely, we nd the
best reform policies that feature no old age transfers and no asset taxes/subsidies. In this regard,
the eciency gains from these policies can be viewed as an upper bound on what can be gained
through privatization policies.
To carry out this exercise we need to put restrictions on the type of policies available to
the government. First, note that in the absence of asset taxes and subsidies, the individuals’
consumption allocations must satisfy the following equation
Pj (θ)u
′ (cj (θ))
Pj+1 (θ) β (θ) (1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
= 1 (36)
all ages j and for all ability types θ. This equation is simply the restriction that individuals do not
face taxes/subsidies on their risk free asset returns.
In order to nd the best policies that respect the no tax/subsidy restrictions, we solve planning
problem (10) subject to constraints (11), (12), (13) and the no tax/subsidy constraint (36). Imposing
constraint (36) guarantees that the allocation can be implemented without the need for asset
38See Nishiyama and Smetters (2007) and McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) for example.
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Figure 12: Optimal labor income tax functions with privatization (no old age transfers and no
asset subsidies). The left panel are marginal taxes, while the right panel shows average taxes.
The black dashed line is the eective status quo tax schedule.
taxes/subsidies. However, these allocations cost more than the allocations that result under fully
optimal reform policies discussed in the main text. Note that we only impose restrictions on asset
taxes and do not impose any restriction on earnings taxes.
We start by comparing labor income tax functions. Figure 12 (left panel) shows the optimal
marginal taxes under privatization policies. Note that marginal rates are lower than status quo for
almost all income levels. Moreover, for most income levels the drop in marginal taxes match the
level of payroll taxes. In this regard, our optimal policies mimic a key feature of the privatization
proposals.
However, there is also a crucial dierence that our optimal labor tax rates are negative for the
poorest individuals. The no subsidy restriction, tilts the optimal proles of consumption towards
younger ages. To accommodate this higher consumption, low income individuals must work
more. The negative marginal income tax provides the incentive needed for these low ability
individuals to increase their work eort. Right panel in Figure 12 shows the optimal average
taxes.
Table 7 shows changes in the aggregate variables. Note that under privatization policies
present discounted value of consumption, net of labor income, rises relative to status quo. 39
Finally, these policies lead to slightly lower stock of capital. Consumption and output are
39This is in contrast to McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) who nd a Pareto improving privatization policy.
Their nding relies on the choice of elasticity of labor supply. As we show in appendix D.1, when elasticity of labor
supply is high, it is possible to reduce resource cost through privatization and hence a Pareto improving privatization
policy exists.
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Table 7: Aggregate eects of privatization
Current U.S. OptimalReform Privatization
Values relative to GDP
Consumption 0.70 0.67 0.70
Capital 3.00 3.43 2.99
Tax revenue (total) 0.25 0.26 0.23
Earnings tax 0.15 0.15 0.13
Consumption tax 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital (corporate) tax 0.06 0.07 0.06
Transfers 0.14 0.13 0.04
To retirees 0.09 0.03 0.00
To workers 0.05 0.03 0.04
Asset subsidies 0.00 0.07 0.00
Change relative to status quo (%)
GDP – 7.15 0.15
Consumption – 2.59 0.22
Capital – 22.34 -0.08
Labor input – -1.39 -0.28
PDV of net resources – -5.15 2.25
slightly higher due to higher labor supply. The labor supply will be higher because of the lower
tax on labor income (see Figure 12).
C.2 Optimal linear asset subsidies
The central feature of our optimal reform policies is the nonlinear subsidies on asset. There are
two reasons for nonlinearity of these subsidies. As we showed in equation (21), the marginal
rates can be decomposed to two terms. One is the type specic mortality rate, and the other is
the ecient inter-temporal (annuity) wedge. Both these terms crucially depend on mortality het-
erogeneity. To gauge the importance of mortality heterogeneity – and therefore the nonlinearity
in assets subsidies – we experiment with the set of policies that only use linear asset subsidies
(or taxes).
Linearity restriction on asset tax/subsidies impose restrictions on set of implementable alloca-
tions. To be more precise, in order for allocations to be implementable by linear asset tax/subsidies,
the following condition must hold
Pj (θ)u
′ (cj (θ))
Pj+1 (θ) β (θ) (1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ))
=
Pj (θ
′)u′ (cj (θ′))
Pj+1 (θ′) β (θ′) (1 + r)u′ (cj+1 (θ′))
(37)
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Figure 13: Optimal asset tax functions: linear subsidies vs nonlinear subsidies. The left panel
shows marginal taxes over all asset levels at ages 65, 75 and 85, while the right panel shows
average marginal rates at each age from 65 to 85. Blue lines are optimal linear subsidies. Red
lines on fully optimal nonlinear subsidies. The dashed line is the population mortality index.
all ages j and for all types θ and θ′. This equation simply implies that the inter-temporal marginal
rate of substitution must be equal all types (and therefore, all asset levels).
In order to nd the best policies that respect the linear asset tax/subsidy restrictions, we solve
planning problem (10) subject to constraints (11), (12), (13) and the linear tax constraint (37).
Imposing constraint (37) guarantees that the allocation can be implemented by a linear set of
asset tax/subsidies.
It is important to remind the reader that in our model, even in the absence of dierential
mortality and dierential discount factor, the optimal subsidies on assets are not zero. If there is
no annuity market, the asset subsidies are needed to correct the ineciency due to incomplete
market. In that case these subsidies will be linear and the rate will be equal to average popula-
tion mortality at each age. In Figure 13 (right panel) we plot the optimal linear asset subsidies
in our model along with average marginal taxes in a fully optimal system (with nonlinear subsi-
dies) and average population mortality index. The gure shows a large dierence in these three
measures. The optimal linear subsidies are much lower than average mortality in the population.
This implies that, even in deriving simple policies with linear subsidies, the dierential mortality
cannot be ignored. In other words, we still need to include these features in the model to correctly
capture the eect of heterogeneity in mortality on optimal policies.
Figure 14 shows the marginal labor income tax functions. Note that linearity restriction on
asset taxes/subsidies results in negative marginal tax on labor income for poorest individuals (left
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Figure 14: Optimal labor income tax functions with linear asset subsidies. The left panel are
marginal taxes, while the right panel shows average taxes. Right panel are average taxes. The
black dashed line is the eective status quo tax schedule.
panel). When subsidies are linear, the marginal rates are much lower for the poorest individuals
(relative to the ones that result from fully optimal policies). Therefore, restrictions on proper
asset subsidies puts the burden of the redistribution on the labor income tax. In the absence
of proper asset subsidies the consumption for the poor is more front loaded. To accommodate
high consumption labor income tax must be low (even negative). Also, note that tax rates at
the top is higher under policies with linear subsidy restriction. Linear subsidies imply that high
income individuals receive too much asset subsidies (relative to full optimal). Therefore, again,
the burden of redistribution in on the labor income tax to correct this excess subsidization of the
high income workers.
Table 8 shows the eect on aggregate variables. Aggregate output, consumption and capital is
aected similarly to the fully optimal reform. However, restricted policies only achieve a fraction
of cost saving that is achieved by the fully optimal reform policies.
D Robustness
In this section we examine the robustness of our ndings with regards to the choice of labor
supply elasticity. All calculations are performed in an economy with current U.S. demographics
and xed factor prices (at the calibrated status quo values).
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Table 8: Aggregate eects of linear subsidies
Current U.S. OptimalReform
Linear
subsidies
Values relative to GDP
Consumption 0.70 0.67 0.67
Capital 3.00 3.43 4.45
Tax revenue (total) 0.25 0.26 0.25
Earnings tax 0.15 0.15 0.14
Consumption tax 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital (corporate) tax 0.06 0.07 0.07
Transfers 0.14 0.13 0.08
To retirees 0.09 0.03 0.00
To workers 0.05 0.03 0.01
Asset subsidies 0.00 0.07 0.08
Changes relative to status quo (%)
GDP – 7.15 7.88
Consumption – 2.59 3.02
Capital – 22.34 24.09
Labor input – -1.39 -1.23
PDV of net resources – -5.15 -3.19
D.1 Labor supply elasticity
In our benchmark calibration we assume the Frisch elasticity of labor supply to be ε = 0.5 which
is in the range estimated in micro studies and very common in quantitative life cycle macroeco-
nomic models.40 In this section we report our results for ε = 2.5 which is more in line with values
calibrated using macro aggregates in the real business cycle studies (see McGrattan and Prescott
(forthcoming) for example). We re-calibrate our model using this value for ε. The calibrated
parameter are presented in Table 9.
We rst check the optimality of status quo policies using the conditions derived in Proposition
4. The results are demonstrated in Figure 15. Note that the earning tax schedule fails the test (left
panel) not only at the social security earning cap, but also at the very top income levels. This is
expected. When elasticity of labor supply is high, it is more likely that for some workers there
is a Laer eect. Therefore, it is possible to reduce tax rates for some individuals (and improve
their welfare) while increasing tax revenue. However, this applies to a small fraction of earnings
distribution.
As in the benchmark case, the status quo asset taxes (or absence of them) also fails the ef-
ciency test. However, notice that the term Dj (θ) (drawn in black) are larger here (relative to
40See Keane (2011) and Chetty et al. (2011); Chetty (2012).
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Table 9: Calibrated Parameters – high labor supply elasticity
Parameters Description Values
β0 discount factor: level 0.974
β1 discount factor: elasticity w.r.t θ 0.006
ψ weight on leisure 0.716
Targeted Moments Data Model
Wealth-income ratio 3 3
Wealth gini 0.78 0.78
Average annual hours 2000 2000
benchmark – compare to Figure 4). This means that we should expect the optimal asset subsidies
be smaller in the case where elasticity of labor supply is high. We plot these optimal asset taxes
in Figure 16.
Finally, Figure 17 shows the optimal labor income taxes. The left panel are optimal taxes
in the full optimal reform. The right panel are optimal taxes in the restricted reform that does
not feature asset subsidies and old age transfer (i.e., privatization). Two observations here. First,
the optimal labor income taxes are much lower that status quo, especially for high income level.
This is a contrast to the benchmark calculations which feature lower elasticity of labor supply.
Second, the optimal tax rates in the full optimal reform and privatization reform are very similar
(although, not identical).
We report the aggregate eects of full optimal reform and privatization reform in Table 10.
With high labor supply elasticities gains in eciency are larger. Moreover, there are gains even
in the privatization reform where asset subsidies are restricted to be equal zero (and there are no
old age transfers). However, without utilizing the optimal asset subsidies, only a third of the cost
saving can be achieved.
These ndings are in line with McGrattan and Prescott (forthcoming) who report the existence
of a Pareto improving privatization reform for their benchmark model that has elasticity of labor
supply equal to 2.6. They also report results with labor supply elasticity of 0.5 and nd that their
privatization reform is not Pareto improving. This is consistent with our ndings in appendix
C.1.
To summarize, asset subsidies remain an integral part of Pareto optimal policies even in a spec-
ication with high labor supply elasticity. In this case, under optimal policies, major changes in
earnings taxes applies only to top earning levels, while large asset subsidies apply to all individ-
uals.
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Figure 15: Test of Pareto optimality for status quo policies – high elasticity of labor supply. The
left panel is the test of earnings tax schedule. The black lines are the left hand side of inequality
(22). The test fails only at the social security maximum taxable earnings’ cap. The right panel is
the test of asset tax. The black lines are the right hand side of Equation (23). The red lines are the
left hand side of that equation (equal to survival rate). This test fails everywhere.
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Figure 16: Optimal asset tax functions – high elasticity of labor supply. The left panel shows
marginal taxes over all asset levels at ages 65, 75 and 85, while the right panel shows average
marginal rates at each age from 65 to 85. The dashed line is the population mortality index.
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Figure 17: Optimal asset tax functions – high elasticity of labor supply. The left panel shows
optimal marginal taxes under fully optimal reform. The right panel shows optimal marginal
taxes under privatization. The dashed line is the status quo eective tax rate.
Table 10: Aggregate eects of reforms – high labor supply elasticity
Current U.S. OptimalReform Privatization
Values relative to GDP
Consumption 0.70 0.67 0.69
Capital 3.00 3.43 3.16
Tax revenue (total) 0.26 0.26 0.24
Earnings tax 0.16 0.15 0.14
Consumption tax 0.04 0.04 0.04
Capital (corporate) tax 0.06 0.07 0.06
Transfers 0.15 0.13 0.08
To retirees 0.09 0.03 0.01
To workers 0.06 0.05 0.07
Asset subsidies 0.00 0.05 0.00
Changes relative to status quo (%)
GDP – 7.13 3.32
Consumption – 2.54 1.72
Capital – 22.42 8.67
Labor input – -1.48 0.31
PDV of net resources – -5.15 -1.93
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